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Abstract
We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions
in their search results if these set lower hotel prices at other OTAs or on their own
websites. We formally characterize how an OTA can use such a strategy to reduce
price differentiation across distribution channels. Our empirical analysis shows that
the position of a hotel in the search results of OTAs is better when the prices charged
by the hotel on other channels are higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that OTAs alter their search results to discipline hotels for aggressive prices on com-
peting channels, thereby reducing the search quality for consumers.
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1 Introduction
Online travel agents (OTAs) have become important intermediaries for hotels and con-
sumers.1 They pool the offers of different hotels and help consumers to find a hotel room
offer. A consumer searching for a hotel room at an OTA typically retrieves a list with
offers from various hotels. The ranking of these offers affects which hotels consumers are
likely to book (Ursu, 2018). Consumers may often believe that offers with higher match
values have been ranked higher according to the consumer’s own needs. More suspicious
minds may argue that OTAs charge the hotels commission fees per booking, such that
OTAs benefit when offers with a high likelihood of a booking at the OTA are made the
most visible. In this article we investigate both theoretically and empirically the question
of whether OTAs condition their rankings of search results on the hotel prices at other
OTAs or on the hotels’ websites. Our results suggest that the OTA conditions its recom-
mended ranking on certain factors that are relevant for the OTA to maximize its profit,
but arguably not to maximize the match value of consumers.
In the theory part, we first establish a reference ranking of hotel offers according to the
expected match values for consumers. The labels on major OTAs’ default rankings are
consistent with this approach. For instance, Expedia labels its default ranking “Recom-
mended” and Booking.com uses the terms “Our top picks” and “The best selection for
business travelers.”2 We then show that an OTA which maximizes its profits may have
incentives to present offers with a higher booking likelihood on the OTA website more
prominently, to the detriment of the matching quality (search bias). We show that this
can create a relationship between the ranking and the hotel prices on other sales chan-
nels. Through this relationship the OTA can influence the hotels in their pricing across
distribution channels without directly conditioning the ranking on the price differentials
across channels. This is to some extent a substitute to price parity clauses (PPCs)3 as
it can induce hotels to reduce discounts on direct channel prices relative to OTA prices.
Moreover, we show that an OTA may also employ a policy whereby it conditions the
ranking directly, and possibly more drastically, on whether a hotel is offering lower prices
on competing channels. We consider this distinction to be relevant. For instance, in the
context of narrowing down its PPCs in Europe, Booking.com committed to various na-
1 See European Hotel Distribution Study 2018 (last accessed August 31, 2018).
2 Labels last checked on August 31, 2018. The term for business travelers is translated from the
German website version.
3 With a price parity clause an OTA contractually obliges a hotel to not charge lower prices on (certain)
competing sales channels, such as other OTAs and the direct channel of the hotel. They are also
called best price clauses and (retail) most favored nation (MFN) clauses.
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tional competition authorities to not directly condition the ranking on price parity across
channels.4
We investigate empirically how changes of a hotel’s prices on competing sales channels
affect the hotel’s position in the default rankings that appear in response to a search query
via Booking.com and Expedia. We use web-scraped data of (i) Booking.com, (ii) Expedia,
and (iii) the meta-search site Kayak.5 The data comprises daily search results for 250
cities in 13 countries, mostly from Europe, between July 2016 until January 2017. Thus,
we can track the listings and prices of more than 18,000 hotels for the same hotel room
offers on different online channels. We use additional information to isolate the effect of
a lower price on competing sales channels on the ranking position from other factors that
might affect the overall ranking. These include promotional activities for specific hotel
offers, as reported by the OTA, as well as information on whether hotels paid additional
fees to the OTA in order to improve their rankings. We use both linear panel estimations
with hotel fixed effects and rank-ordered logit regressions.
We find that for a given hotel price at an OTA, a lower price at the other OTA or on the
hotel’s website leads to a worse ranking position, both at Booking.com and Expedia. This
relationship holds in countries both with and without PPC clauses. It is also robust to
different functional forms of the price differences and significant for both downward and
upward deviations. The relationship is more pronounced for substantial price differences
of around 10% and above. When using specifications with lags and leads of the price
differences across channels, we do not see a systematic pattern of significant correlations
between price differences in the future with rankings today (which could be an indication
of reverse causality). We also find that hotels price differentiate in a plausible way. For
instance, hotels set the direct channel price lower if demand is high and the travel date is
close to the booking date.
We conclude with a discussion of the potential risks of an OTA’s ranking optimization
being based on measures such as the prices of competing offers, which by themselves are
unrelated to the intrinsic consumer value of the offers presented by the OTA. Regarding
consumer protection, we debate whether consumers should be made more aware of how
the rankings of OTAs and similar online platforms are computed.
4 See section 3 for references and subsection 4.7 for a more detailed discussion.
5 The website of the meta-search site Kayak looks similar to that of an OTA such as Booking.com,
but – different from an OTA – presents price offers of the different OTAs and the hotel websites.
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2 Related literature
Our theory relates most closely to the literature on intermediaries who can decide which
product to present first or particularly prominently (Raskovich, 2007; Inderst and Ot-
taviani, 2012; Hunold and Muthers, 2017; Shen and Wright, 2018). Hagiu and Jullien
(2011, 2014) specifically analyze biases in the rankings of search engines. In a setting
where customers have heterogeneous search costs and the platform has a per-click pay-
ment scheme, Hagiu and Jullien (2011) predict distortions in the ranking in the sense that
the less suitable product is displayed first to generate additional revenue from the product
providers. Moreover, they also consider the situation that producers know the result of
the ranking algorithm before setting prices. De Corniere and Taylor (2014) show that
vertically integrated search engines distort search results, but the overall welfare effect is
unclear because, for example, the integrated search engine can have a strong incentive to
generate demand.
To our knowledge, to date there are no empirical research articles that analyze the rela-
tion between the position of hotels in an OTA’s search results and the hotel’s prices on
competing sales channels. Yet, there is a literature which highlights the importance of
OTA rankings for the booking choices of consumers. Chen and Yao (2016), De los Santos
and Koulayev (2017), Koulayev (2014), and Ghose et al. (2012, 2014) study how rankings
affect consumer online choices in the hotel market and provide estimates of the US dollar
equivalent of a change in a hotel offer’s indirect utility for a consumer resulting from a
one-position increase in a hotel’s ranking (position effect). De los Santos and Koulayev
(2017) find position effects ranging from $7.76 to $35.15, whereas Ghose et al. (2012) find
an average effect of $6.24, and Koulayev (2014) reports a range from $2.93 to $18.78.
Ursu (2018) exploits a random variation in the ranking of hotels at the OTA Expedia
and finds lower position effects, ranging between $0.55 to $3.19. She finds that consumers
click more often on an offer that is ranked better to get detailed information about it.
However, conditional on seeing the detailed information, the ranking position does not
influence the booking behavior of consumers.
Lu et al. (2015) study the relationship between the pricing of intermediaries, such as
physical travel agents, and the introduction of a new online direct sales channel of a hotel
chain. Using the data of hotel room transactions from 2001 to 2007, they analyze the
introduction of the direct online sales channel in 2002 and find a significant reduction of
the intermediaries’ price premia. This result suggests that there is competition between
different forms of hotel distribution channels.
Our work is also related to the recent theoretical literature on the (anti-)competitive
effects of price parity clauses (PPCs) of intermediaries, such as OTAs (Edelman and
Wright, 2015; Boik and Corts, 2016; Johnson, 2017; Wang and Wright, 2017; Johansen
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and Vergé, 2017; Ronayne and Taylor, 2018; Wals and Schinkel, 2018). To this literature
we add the insight that non-contractual measures, such as ranking the search results on
factors other than maximizing consumer matches, can have similar effects as PPCs.
This article also relates to the growing empirical literature on the effects of price parity
clauses by online booking platforms, such as Hunold et al. (2018) and Mantovani et al.
(2017). Hunold et al. (2018) study the PPCs of OTAs using meta-search price data
of hotels. They find that PPCs influence the pricing and availability of hotel rooms
across online sales channels. In particular, the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow PPC
is associated with a hotel’s direct channel being the price leader more often. Moreover,
they find that hotels make rooms more often available at Booking.com when it does not
use the narrow PPC. These findings indicate that pricing across channels is important for
hotels and also raise the question of whether non-contractual measures that aim at the
OTA’s prices being lowest have become more important in jurisdictions where contractual
measures, in particular price parity clauses, were restricted.
3 Industry background: Online hotel booking
Distribution channels. One can book hotels through various channels. Traditionally,
a large share of consumers book rooms directly at the hotel, both oﬄine by telephone
or walk-in, and online via the hotel website and e-mail. According to the European
hotel association HOTREC, these channels make up 50 percent of all bookings, the latter
comprising 14 and 16 percent, respectively.6 In the last decade, OTAs became very
important for hotels as a distribution channel. While the share of hotel bookings through
OTAs was already 22 percent in 2013, this number steadily increased to 29 percent in
2017, comprising around 75 percent of all website-based bookings of hotel rooms. The
OTA industry is highly concentrated – in 2017 Booking.com and Expedia accounted for
more than 80 percent of those bookings in Europe, with Booking.com having, on average,
a share of more than 60 percent.
Ranking of hotel offers at OTAs. OTAs are intermediaries that pool the offers of
different hotels and help consumers to find a hotel room. In response to a search request,
consumers retrieve a list of recommended offers. The label for this default list is “Our top
picks” at Booking.com and “Recommended” at Expedia.7 Despite the ability of consumers
6 This and the following data is taken from the European Hotel Distribution Study 2018 (last accessed
August 31, 2018).
7 Labels last checked on August 31, 2018.
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to refine their search through filters (sorting by price, location, etc.), there is evidence
that a significant share of consumers rely on default rankings. Using a dataset from
the Wharton Customer Analytics Initiative, Ursu (2018) shows that only 34 percent of
consumers sort or filter hotel search results at an undisclosed OTA.8 The rest make use of
the default ranking, and as Ursu (2018) shows, high-ranked hotels receive more clicks (and
hence more bookings). De los Santos and Koulayev (2017) report for a price comparison
website that more than 50 percent of users rely on the default ranking. Similarly, Blake
et al. (2016) report that on eBay between 67 and 85 percent of search requests have the
default ranking.
Although OTAs do not reveal their default ranking algorithm, Expedia provides a general
idea of the typical criteria.9 First, the ranking depends on a price-to-value benchmark,
which is based on criteria like price, ratings, location, etc. Second, it depends on how well
a hotel partners with the OTA, e.g., by comparing room rates offered on the platform to
those offered on other channels, or by assessing how much information the hotel provides
on the platform. Third, a hotel’s ranking position is affected by the commission rate
it pays to the OTA. Booking.com’s ranking is stated to be dependent on information
provided by the hoteliers and customers, including among others conversion, availability,
and pricing data.10
Pricing. Most OTAs today use the agency model, where hotels sign up at the OTA,
provide details regarding their offers, and set retail prices on their own. Any offers that
match a specific search request are listed in the corresponding search output. While
signing up is usually free of charge, the OTA demands a commission for each booking on its
website. Booking.com has used this model for a long time and we understand that Expedia
also typically uses this model in Europe.11 The commission is a share of the hotel price.12
Base commission rates are around 10 to 15 percent for both Booking.com and Expedia
and have remained constant in recent years. However, effective commission rates can be
significantly higher.13 Booking.com offers a “Visibility Booster” that allows hotels to pay
higher commissions in exchange for better ranking positions on specific dates, and the
“Preferred Partner Program,” which also involves paying a higher commission for “extra
8 See Ursu (2018), page 6 of the Online Appendix B, for details (last accessed August 31, 2018).
9 See, for instance, a communication by Expedia that targets hoteliers (last accessed August 31, 2018).
10 See the respective help page for hoteliers on Booking.com (last accessed August 31, 2018).
11 See the annual reports of Booking.com and Expedia as well as the article Expedia and TripAdvisor
Separately Kill 2 Brands That Were Once Sister Companies (last accessed August 31, 2018).
12 See the respective help page for hoteliers on Booking.com (last accessed August 31, 2018).
13 See Hunold et al. (2018), Online Appendix VIII, for references and details.
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visibility,” among other things.14 Expedia offers a similar service called “Accelerator”
through which hotels can improve their ranking position by paying a higher commission.15
The additional commission paid for such services can be as high as 10 to 15 percent.16
Price parity clauses (PPCs). A major concern for OTAs is free-riding, where con-
sumers use the platform’s search and comparison service, but ultimately book through
a cheaper channel, leaving the OTA without the commission.17 As free-riding is incen-
tivized by lower prices on other channels, many OTAs have used, and partly still use,
price parity clauses (PPCs) in order to mitigate aggressive pricing. There are two main
types of PPCs to distinguish. Under a wide PPC, an OTA obliges the hotel not to charge
a higher price on the OTA than on any other online (and partly oﬄine) booking channel,
which in particular includes other OTAs and the hotel’s own direct sales channels. Nar-
row PPCs prohibit the hotel from offering lower prices on its direct online sales channels
than at the OTA that imposes the clause, but do not contractually restrict the hotel’s
room prices at other OTAs.18 These PPCs in the contracts between OTAs and hotels
differ fundamentally from price matching policies, where OTAs guarantee customers the
lowest available price for an offer. Both Booking.com and Expedia had a price matching
policy in place during the period of observation, with Expedia restricting this guarantee
to registered users in late 2017.19
National competition law enforcement or new national laws typically target the contracts
between the OTAs and the hotels in the respective jurisdiction. Various national com-
petition authorities in Europe considered that (wide) PPCs could restrict competition
between OTAs with respect to commission rates, which is the main theory of harm (see
the discussion in section 2).
Figure 1 shows a timeline of policy changes regarding PPCs. In December 2013, the Ger-
man competition authority prohibited the German incumbent OTA HRS from applying
PPCs.20 In April 2015, following joint investigations, competition authorities in Sweden,
France, and Italy simultaneously accepted commitments from Booking.com to only im-
pose narrow PPCs. Subsequently, in June Booking.com announced an extension of these
14 See Booking.com’s website on the Preferred Partner Programme (last accessed August 31, 2018).
15 See Expedia’s website on Visibility (last accessed August 31, 2018).
16 See the article First Look at Expedia Accelerator Program for Improving Hotel Placement (last ac-
cessed August 31, 2018).
17 See, for instance, Booking.com’s arguments as discussed in the German Federal Cartel Office’s
decision prohibiting Booking.com’s narrow price parity clauses (last accessed August 31, 2018).
18 See Hunold (2017) for details and a comparison of different decisions with respect to PPCs in Europe.
19 See the archived websites of Booking.com and Expedia respectively (last accessed August 31, 2018).
20 See German Federal Cartel Office’s decision prohibiting HRS to apply price parity clauses (last
accessed August 31, 2018).
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commitments to the rest of Europe.21 Expedia reacted to this in July 2015 by announcing
that it would also abolish their wide PPCs in Europe.22
Figure 1: Policy actions against price parity clauses (PPCs) of online travel agents (OTAs)
– Timeline
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
12-2013
Germany
Competition Authority
No PPCs for HRS
04-2015
France, Italy, Sweden
Competition Authorities
Only Narrow PPCs for Booking.com
07-2015
Europe
Booking.com & Expedia
Only Narrow PPCs
07-2015
France
Parliament
No PPCs
12-2015
Germany
Competition Authority
No PPCs for Booking.com
11-2016
Austria
Parliament
No PPCs
08-2017
Italy
Senate
No PPCs
09-2017
Switzerland
Parliament
No PPCs (planned)
07-2018
Belgium
Parliament
No PPCs
07-2018
Sweden
Patent and Market Court
No PPCs for Booking.com
Date
Country
Body
Decision
In the following years, narrow PPCs were also prohibited in several countries. Starting
with the removal of PPCs by the French parliament in July 2015, OTAs are nowadays
also prohibited from using narrow PPCs in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and soon in
Switzerland.23 In Germany, only the narrow PPCs of Booking.com and HRS are explicitly
prohibited, whereas the case for Expedia is still pending. To the best of our knowledge,
authorities in northern America have not taken action against the PPCs of OTAs.24 We
understand that OTAs still use wide PPCs in the US and Canada. Although the largest
OTAs are not allowed to use (wide) PPCs in Europe anymore, hotels raise concerns that
OTAs might implicitly enforce price parity by lowering the ranking positions of hotels
which offer better rates elsewhere.25
21 See the amendment by Booking.com (last accessed August 31, 2018).
22 See the amendment by Expedia (last accessed August 31, 2018).
23 See Hunold et al. (2018), Online Appendix I, and the respective pages of Belgium, Italy, Sweden,
and Switzerland for more recent actions (last accessed August 31, 2018).
24 In 2014, the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed an antitrust lawsuit
aimed at restricting OTAs in applying PPCs. (last accessed August 31, 2018).
25 See section 4.15, page 23 of the Report on the Monitoring Exercise carried out in the Online Hotel
Booking Sector by EU Competition Authorities in 2016 (last accessed August 31, 2018).
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4 Model
4.1 Best match ranking
Our reference is a ranking that maximizes consumer net match values of the offers avail-
able at the OTA. We illustrate such a ranking for the case of two symmetric, spatially
differentiated hotels and one OTA. This generalizes to other forms of differentiation and
more than two hotels.
Hotel L is located at the left end of a line of length one, hotel R at the right end. There
is a mass one of consumers. Each consumer has an ideal location x ∈ [0, 1], which is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The OTA learns about the location as the
consumer types in its location x in the search request. We assume that this translates
into a probability of x that hotel R is the best match and, by symmetry, a complementary
probability 1−x that hotel L is the best match. In the case of a best match, let the gross
match value be Vi, i ∈ {L,R}, and vi < Vi otherwise (this could be zero, for instance).
The net match value in the case of a best match with hotel i is thus Vi− pOTAi (assuming
that Vi is larger than pOTAi , the price for hotel i at the OTA). The expected match value
is x ·
(
VR − pOTAR
)
for hotel R and (1− x)
(
VL − pOTAL
)
for hotel L.
A best match ranking is such that for each x, the OTA shows the hotel that yields the
highest expected match value on top. For symmetric valuations and prices, this means
hotel R for x ≥ 0.5 and hotel L for x ≤ 0.5. We summarize the hotel’s ranking choice
with the threshold value, which we denote r. For symmetric hotels, the value r = 0.5 thus
defines the best match ranking; a value of r < 0.5 means that the ranking is biased toward
hotel R, and r > 0.5 implies a bias toward hotel L. For the purpose of this analysis we
use the terms bias and search bias as descriptions of a ranking that does not maximize
the match values for consumers. Hence, we do not exclude that there might be legitimate
business reasons for a deviation from a best match ranking.
Lemma 1. A best match ranking depends on the prices at the OTA, but not on the prices
on other channels.
4.2 Hotel pricing and standard OTA ranking optimization
We now analyze how an OTA can use the ranking to optimally respond to the prices
charged by hotels on their different channels. Each hotel has a direct channel (“DIR”)
and is present at the OTA. We first consider the following game:
1. Each hotel i ∈ {L,R} sets prices pki on the channels k ∈ {DIR,OTA}.
2. The OTA observes these prices and optimizes its ranking with respect to r.
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We refer to this as standard profit maximization. We solve this game of complete informa-
tion for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria using backward induction. This means that we
first solve the OTA ranking optimization for given hotel prices (subsection 4.3), and then
solve the hotels’ pricing game in anticipation of the OTA’s ranking optimization (sub-
section 4.4). An OTA may also employ a policy whereby it announces it will condition
the ranking directly on price differences in a certain way. We show in subsection 4.7 that
it can be profitable for an OTA to commit to such a direct conditioning prior to hotels
setting prices.
In order to keep the model simple, we conduct our analysis for a given level of commission
rates that the OTAs charge the hotels per booking on the OTA website. Arguably, a
major determinant of the commission rate is competition among OTAs (from which we
abstract in this model). Other articles specifically study the commission rates and show
that OTA competition is particularly important in this context (Boik and Corts, 2016;
Johnson, 2017; Wang and Wright, 2017; Shen and Wright, 2018; Teh and Wright, 2018).
Endogenizing the commission rates would make the model much more complicated and is
not the core of the present analysis.26 Our model nevertheless provides interesting insights
into the relationship of pricing and ranking for any level of commission rates.
The demand of hotel i is given by
qi = [αφi(r) + (1− α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumers interested in hotel i
·
[
qOTAi + qDIRi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
booking likelihood
. (1)
The term in the left brackets is the mass of potential consumers of hotel i. The parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of consumers for which the ranking is relevant.27 For
instance, α of the consumers may rely on the ranking of the OTA, whereas 1 − α of the
consumers find hotels in other ways.28 For α > 0, the OTA can use the ranking decision
r to influence whether more consumers are interested in one or the other hotel.
Assumption 1. The function φi(r), i = L,R, with r ∈ [0, 1], satisfies the following
conditions:
26 See, for instance, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) who show that commission payments increase when
the intermediary is less interested in customers buying the right product. Shen and Wright (2018)
introduce a direct sales channel in the model and show that when the intermediary chooses the level
of commission, free-riding due to lower direct selling prices tends to occur.
27 Parameter α can also be interpreted as the degree with which a representative consumer is sensitive
to the ranking.
28 For instance, consumers might use a different ordering of offers at the OTA, such as by lowest price,
or a general search engine, such as Google, or a meta-search site for hotels that collects prices from
different channels, such as Kayak or Trivago.
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• ∂φL/∂r > 0 > ∂φR/∂r (bias is good for one and bad for the other hotel),
• 12 = argmaxr φ(r) (maximum is attained at unbiased ranking of 1/2),
• φi(r) = φ−i(1− r) (symmetry between hotels),
• φ′′i < 0 (strict concavity – to ensure well-behaved optimization problems).
One can obtain a simple parameterization of φi from the example in subsection 4.1.
For this, assume that consumers only consider buying the highest ranked hotel offer.29
Moreover, assume that the value in the case of a bad match is sufficiently low such that
a booking does not take place (vi = 0, for instance). For a given threshold r ∈ [0, 1], the
mass of consumers that sees hotel L as the top-ranked hotel and realizes the high match
value is
φL =
∫ r
0
(1− x) dx =
[
x− 12x
2
]r
0
= r − 12r
2, (2)
and that for hotel R is
φR =
∫ 1
r
x dx =
[1
2x
2
]1
r
= 12
(
1− r2
)
. (3)
The best match ranking is obtained for r = 1/2. If r > 1/2, the OTA is said to bias the
ranking in favor of L (and to R for r < 1/2). The total mass of consumers that realize a
high match value and are interested in booking a hotel, φL + φR, decreases in the OTA’s
bias toward one hotel, that is, |r − 12 |.
The terms qOTAi (pOTAi , pDIRi ) and qDIRi (pDIRi , pOTAi ) in the right brackets of equation (1)
can be interpreted as the likelihood that a consumer will book hotel i through the direct
channel or the OTA. The likelihood of booking on a channel decreases in the price on
that channel, increases in the price of the other channel, and decreases when both prices
increase.
Assumption 2. The booking likelihood satisfies the following conditions:
• ∂qki /∂pki < 0 (demand decreases in own price),
• ∂qki /∂p−ki > 0, (channels are substitutes),
• ∂qki /∂pki + ∂qki /∂p−ki < 0 (demand decreases in price level),
• qDIRi (x, y) = qOTAi (x, y) (symmetry across channels).
To ensure that the OTA’s maximization problem has an interior solution, we assume that
the expected booking revenue pki qki of a channel is a concave function of the price level,
29 A similar modeling approach is used by Raskovich (2007); Inderst and Ottaviani (2012); Hunold and
Muthers (2017); Shen and Wright (2018).
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so that ∂2(pki qki )/(∂pDIRi )2 + ∂2(pki qki )/(∂pOTAi )2 < 0 for pOTAi = pDIRi .30 For instance, this
is satisfied in the case of the linear relationship qki = 1− pki + γ · p−ki , with 0 < γ < 1.
4.3 OTA optimization (standard profit maximization)
The profit of the OTA is the commission times the bookings at the OTA:
piOTA =
∑
i∈{L,R}
ci p
OTA
i · [αφi(r) + (1− α)] · qOTAi , (4)
where ci is the commission rate the OTA charges hotel i. Using the symmetry assumption
of φi, we can write the OTA’s first-order condition with respect to r as
cL p
OTA
L · qOTAL φ′L(r) = cR pOTAR · qOTAR · φ′L(1− r). (5)
If the expected OTA revenues are equal, the optimal ranking decision is r = 12 , which
maximizes the mass of interested consumers. Otherwise, the OTA optimally favors the
hotel with the higher expected margin. This yields
Lemma 2. The OTA’s ranking of a hotel is better if the commission rate ci that the hotel
pays is higher (holding other things equal).
A decrease in the hotel’s direct price decreases the expected OTA profit from that hotel
as ∂qOTAi /∂pDIRi > 0. This yields
Proposition 1. A hotel’s rank at an OTA is worse if the hotel charges a lower price on
its direct online sales channels (holding other things equal).
An increase of the OTA price pOTAi decreases the likelihood of a booking (∂qOTAi /∂pOTAi <
0), but increases ci pOTAi , the revenue per booking. The relationship between the OTA
price and ranking is therefore not obvious at this point, but we can still state
Lemma 3. A hotel’s rank at the OTA depends positively on the OTA price if the expected
channel revenue pOTAi qOTAi increases in pOTAi (holding other things equal).
30 Note that we abstract from direct price competition between the hotels through the booking likeli-
hoods for a given ranking for reasons of tractability. This is also consistent with the interpretation
of the booking likelihood in the previous subsection if customers only look at the top ranking.
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4.4 Hotel optimization
Let r∗ denote the solution to the OTA’s ranking optimization characterized by (5) as a
function of pOTAi , pDIRi , and ci with i ∈ {L,R}. A hotel’s profit is given by
pii = [αφi(r∗) + (1− α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumers interested in booking hotel i
·
[(
pDIRi − b
)
qDIRi +
(
(1− ci) pOTAi − b
)
qOTAi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hotel’s expected profit per consumer (piCi )
. (6)
For consumers booking on the direct channel, the hotel’s margin is the direct price minus
variable hosting costs b > 0. For consumers booking on the OTA, the commission is an
additional cost.31
In what follows, we restrict attention to demand functions that give rise to quasi-concave
reduced-form hotel profits and a stable interior equilibrium. The following FOCs with
respect to pDIRi and pOTAi characterize the optimal prices:
∂pii
∂pki
= [αφi(r∗) + (1− α)] ∂pi
C
i
∂pki
+ αφ′i(r∗)
∂r∗
∂pki
piCi = 0, (7)
with k ∈ {DIR,OTA}, i ∈ {L,R}.
4.5 Equilibrium with price parity restriction (pOTAi = pDIRi )
Rankings do not matter (α = 0)
For α = 0 the ranking does not affect a hotel’s profit, which becomes
pii = piCi =
(
pDIRi − b
)
qDIRi +
(
(1− ci) pOTAi − b
)
qOTAi .
The optimal uniform price p∗i (α = 0) = pOTAi = pDIRi is defined by
∂piCi
∂pOTAi
+ ∂pi
C
i
∂pDIRi
= 0. (8)
Lemma 4. When rankings do not matter (α = 0) and price parity is required, the optimal
uniform price is above the level that maximizes the expected channel revenue pOTAi qOTAi .
Proof. See Appendix A.
31 We assume here for simplicity that there are no specific direct booking costs. They are most likely
at least significantly lower than the OTA commission.
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Rankings matter (α > 0)
When rankings matter (α > 0), the hotels compete for a favorable ranking of the OTA.
This makes them internalize the profitability of their offers for the OTA.
Proposition 2. When rankings matter (α > 0), each hotel has an incentive to reduce the
uniform price below the level p∗i (α = 0), as this makes the ranking more favorable.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A hotel does not set a lower price than the price that maximizes the OTA’s revenues from
the hotel (a further decrease would lead to a less favorable ranking). Down to this level,
the OTA benefits from price cuts – which the ranking induces. Therefore, biasing rankings
is profitable for the OTA, but hurts symmetric hotels (that pay the same commission rates
and the same costs) as they earn lower margins, even though in a symmetric equilibrium
rankings are unbiased.
Proposition 3. In the case of a price parity clause, biasing rankings leads to higher OTA
profits, and lower profits for symmetric hotels. In equilibrium, consumers benefit through
lower prices.
To interpret the result of lower prices, one must keep in mind that we have kept the
commission rate as exogenous for this analysis. Please see the discussion in subsection
4.8.
4.6 Equilibrium without price parity restriction
Case: Rankings do not matter (α = 0)
The hotel’s optimal prices pOTAi and pDIRi solve
∂piCi
∂pOTAi
= (1− ci) qOTAi +
(
(1− ci) pOTAi − b
) ∂qOTAi
∂pOTAi
+
(
pDIRi − b
) ∂qDIRi
∂pOTAi
= 0, (9)
∂piCi
∂pDIRi
= qDIRi +
(
pDIRi − b
) ∂qDIRi
∂pDIRi
+
(
(1− ci) pOTAi − b
) ∂qOTAi
∂pDIRi
= 0. (10)
At a zero commission rate (ci = 0) the hotel sets equal prices on the direct channel and
at the OTA. A positive commission rate ci > 0 implies a higher OTA price for a given
direct price, yielding
Lemma 5. When rankings do not matter (α = 0) and a hotel can price differentiate, the
optimal OTA price is above the optimal direct price.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Case: Rankings matter (α > 0)
When rankings matter (α > 0), the hotel’s marginal profits with respect to its two prices
pOTAi and pDIRi are not zero at the prices defined by equations (9) and (10) of the case
that rankings do not matter (α = 0). In particular, the marginal profit ∂pii/∂pDIRi ,
as stated in equation (7), is positive because the ranking improves in the direct price:
φ′i(r∗) · ∂r∗/∂pDIRi > 0 (recall Lemma 2).
Lemma 6. Starting from the prices that are optimal when rankings do not matter, the
hotel has an incentive to raise the direct price in order to improve its OTA ranking when
rankings matter.
As the initial OTA price is above the direct price, this means that the ranking induces the
hotel to reduce the discount for the direct channel. Similarly, the hotel has an incentive
to reduce the OTA price if an increase in this price reduces the expected OTA revenue
per consumer (cipOTAi qOTAi ).32
The practice of including the probability of booking into the ranking algorithm tends to
reduce the price dispersion between the OTA and the direct channel, similar to a parity
clause.33 In other words, such non-contractual measures can act as a substitute to the
price parity clause – which policymakers in various countries prohibited (see section 3).
Biasing rankings increases the OTA profit, both when a price parity is applied and when it
is not applied, as the hotels internalize the OTA profit and adjust their prices accordingly.
It is interesting to note that biasing rankings tends to be more profitable for the OTA
when no price parity is used, compared to when it is used.34 The intuition is that a price
parity clause and biasing rankings (when used as a non-contractual disciplinary measure)
are substitutes to some extent. Both reduce the markup of the OTA price over the direct
price (or more generally a price on a channel with lower distribution costs).
4.7 Ranking with direct conditioning on other channel prices
We previously studied the case of standard profit maximization where the OTA ranks ho-
tels for given hotel prices with the objective to maximize the product of commission and
booking likelihood for a given website user. In this case, the ranking depends on prices
on other channels only indirectly through the booking likelihood. The OTA could, how-
32 This is clearly the case with uniform prices, see Lemma 4.
33 One can show that this is the case for large parameter ranges when using a linear specification for
qi and the parameterizations in (2) and (3) for φi.
34 See footnote 33.
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ever, also react more directly and possibly more drastically to lower prices on competing
channels.
To illustrate this channel in the framework of our model, assume that the OTA publicly
commits itself before hotels set prices to maximally worsen the ranking for the hotel with
the higher discount on the direct channel.35 Formally, this means
r =

0 if
(
pOTAL − pDIRL
)
> max
{
0,
(
pOTAR − pDIRR
)}
,
1
2 if
(
pOTAL − pDIRL
)
=
(
pOTAR − pDIRR
)
,
1 if
(
pOTAR − pDIRR
)
> max
{
0,
(
pOTAL − pDIRL
)}
.
(11)
Although this ranking policy might not raise the OTA’s profit in the short-term, it can
discipline hotels and thereby lead to much less aggressive prices elsewhere. This can
ultimately raise the OTA’s profits even more than the standard profit maximization,
which takes the hotel prices as given.
To illustrate matters further, assume that α = 1 and φL(0) = φR(1) = 0. This yields a
hotel profit of zero if one hotel discounts its direct price more than the other hotel (see
equation (6)).
Proposition 4. Assume that α = 1 and φL(0) = φR(1) = 0, and that the OTA commits
itself to the drastic ranking policy described in (11) before hotels set prices. As a conse-
quence, no hotel will discount its direct price in equilibrium. This has the same effect as
a price parity clause.
Proof. For
(
pOTAL − pDIRL
)
> max
{
0,
(
pOTAR − pDIRR
)}
, hotel L makes zero profits. As
a consequence, it must be profit increasing for L to reduce the discount to the level
pOTAR − pDIRR , as this yields a positive profit. An even better adjustment is to reduce the
discount slightly further, as then the ranking changes from r = 12 to r = 1, which implies
a discrete increase of φ. However, now R will react in the same way until pDIRi ≥ pOTAi
for i ∈ {L,R}.
This extreme case is chosen to make the optimization simple and illustrative. Apart from a
strict enforcement of a parity clause, we conjecture that a more realistic parameterization
is much less extreme. However, the rationale that a policy to react rather drastically to
lower prices elsewhere can be attractive for an OTA also applies to less extreme cases. In
the symmetric equilibrium, the OTA does not need to bias its ranking and therefore the
35 In reality, such a commitment does not need to be a public announcement. It may be sufficient that
the OTA acts in this way and hotels learn about the behavior over time.
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ranking still has value for consumers. In the case of symmetric hotels, only in states of
disequilibrium – which may be short term and might only affect a few search results –
does the ranking need to be biased.
It is noteworthy that a distinction between standard profit maximization and a direct
conditioning of the ranking on prices on competing channels finds support in the commit-
ments of Booking.com toward various European competition authorities in 2015. These
state that “Booking.com’s ranking algorithm will not take into account directly whether
an accommodation refuses to enter into or does not comply with Price Parity [...].”36 This
indicates that for competition authorities such a policy was a cause for concern. At the
same time, an “indirect” conditioning on the prices of other channels (as it occurs in the
case of the profit maximization previously modeled) is not explicitly ruled out.
Moreover, under the headline “Understand and help impact your visibility,” Expedia
states in a text addressed to hoteliers that the hotel’s visibility depends on “past behavior”
and, among other things, “a measure of how well you partner with Expedia Group, that
takes into account [...] your room and rate competitiveness on Expedia Group site.”37 This
suggests to us a possibly more direct conditioning of the ranking on prices at competing
channels than just through the booking likelihood as modeled above. We have not spotted
such a statement on the Booking.com website. In view of the above commitments, this is
not surprising.
In general, it appears to be sufficient that an OTA employs a certain ranking policy and
hotels learn about the behavior over time. For instance, a report by various European
competition authorities states that “many hotels mentioned measures taken by OTAs to
’penalize’ unwanted behavior by hotels – such as price and/or availability differentiation
– without relying on parity clauses.”38
4.8 Ranking bias and consumer welfare
We have focused on symmetric hotels and hotel-symmetric equilibria. This typical mod-
eling approach simplifies the analysis, particularly of the different price levels, and is
common in the literature.39 A consequence of the symmetry among hotels is that their
prices on each channel are the same so that the OTA is better off not biasing the ranking
36 See section 4 of the Booking.com commitments to the Swedish competition authority of April 2015
(last accessed August 31, 2018).
37 See Expedia’s website Visibility (last accessed August 31, 2018).
38 The report is based on a survey among hoteliers. See section 8 for references and more details.
39 Other articles that deal with consumer steering and also consider symmetric equilibria (in which
typically no biasing takes place) include Raskovich (2007); Inderst and Ottaviani (2012); Hunold
and Muthers (2017); Shen and Wright (2018).
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in equilibrium. Nevertheless, biasing the ranking in off-equilibrium states is crucial for
the pricing incentives of the hotels and thus the resulting prices.
Beyond the theoretical workhorse of symmetric players and a symmetric equilibrium,
there are many reasons why one might empirically observe biased rankings. First of all,
the hotels might well be heterogeneous. For instance, the direct channel may be more
important for the one hotel than for the other hotel. One can easily incorporate this in
the above model and obtain biased rankings in equilibrium. Similarly, one hotel might
be active at one OTA only, while another hotel is active at two OTAs. This can lead to
different optimal prices across channels in equilibrium, even when hotels take the influence
of their pricing on their ranking at an OTA into account.
Moreover, an economic system is not necessarily in equilibrium at a particular point in
time. Instead, there may be ongoing adjustment processes. This can particularly be the
case in markets where many firms are active and there are frequent demand changes, as
is often plausible for hotel markets.
In the present model, consumer welfare depends both on the price levels and on the
ranking. Starting from a symmetric outcome, several comparative statics are immediate:
• For a given ranking (r), consumers benefit from a price decrease by any hotel on
any channel.
• Given symmetric hotel valuations and prices (pkL = pkR, k = DIR,OTA), a reduction
in ranking bias (that is moving closer to r = 1/2) increases consumer welfare as
consumers realize more optimal matches.
• Given symmetric hotel quality and prices at the OTA, but a lower direct price of
hotel L (pDIRL < pDIRR ), the corresponding ranking that is optimal for the OTA tends
to reduce consumer welfare compared to the best match ranking because it favors
hotel R (see Proposition 1).
One may ask whether biased rankings can also benefit consumers. Within our model
framework, the symmetric equilibrium with price parity indeed features lower consumer
prices if, off-equilibrium, the OTA were to bias the ranking in favor of a hotel with
lower prices (see Proposition 3). However, at the same time the prices increase in the
commission rates – which we have kept exogenous. The main result of various academic
studies with competing OTAs is that PPCs can restrict OTA competition and lead to
excessive commission rates and hotel prices – even above the monopoly level (see section
2). This has also been the main theory of harm of various competition authorities and has
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led to the prohibition of PPCs in various countries (see section 3). We have shown that
the ranking can have effects similar to PPCs in reducing the incentives of hotels to charge
lower prices on other channels. We conjecture that in a richer model with competing
OTAs, this can then also lead to higher commission rates and prices (if there is a drastic
reaction equivalent to a PPC, as shown in subsection 4.7, the insights of the literature on
PPCs should apply). Notwithstanding, one may argue that a profit-maximizing ranking
involving a “bias” may be necessary for the OTA to be profitable. We discuss this issue
further in the concluding section 8.
5 Empirical strategy
5.1 Predictions
To review and compare the different theoretical predictions, let us write the ranking of
hotel i at an OTA in response to a search request s as the following function:
RankingOTAi,s = f
(
vi, p
OTA
i , q
OTA
i , p
COM
i , ci
)
, (12)
and let a higher value mean that the ranking is better (closer to the top of the search
results).
Best match ranking. The ranking should be a positive function of the hotel’s gross
match value vi for the average consumer (“hotel quality”), which should increase in the
number of stars, the user rating, free breakfast, and so on. Given the gross value vi,
the price pOTAi should negatively affect the ranking as, other things equal, a higher price
should mean a lower net match value for the average consumer. Moreover, the booking
likelihood qOTAi (conditional on the true match value and price) should not influence the
ranking. Likewise, the commission rate ci and the price pCOMi for the hotel offer on other
channels should not matter for the best match ranking of the OTA’s hotel offers.
Standard OTA profit maximization. The booking likelihood should also have a
positive influence now as the OTA generates income on a per-booking basis. For the
same reason, the commission rate should have a positive influence. Whether the hotel
price at this OTA enters negatively or positively is not as obvious. On the one hand, a
higher price means a lower net match value for the consumer, which reduces the booking
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likelihood. However, conditional on observing the booking likelihood (which is possibly a
function of the prices), the hotel price at the OTA should have no (direct) negative effect.
On the other hand, the commission is the product of the commission rate and the OTA
price, which speaks for a positive influence of the OTA price on the ranking.
When the OTA maximizes its profit for given prices, one could argue that the gross match
value vi does not matter anymore. Moreover, conditional on the booking likelihood, the
hotel’s prices on competing channels should have no influence. However, it is clear that
the match value should positively affect the booking likelihood, whereas lower prices on
competing channels should decrease the booking likelihood.
Direct conditioning of the ranking on prices of other channels. In this case,
the OTA directly conditions the ranking on price differentials in order to discipline the
hotel. Different from the standard profit maximization, for a given booking likelihood,
higher hotel prices on competing channels should now have an effect and lead to a worse
ranking position.
5.2 Methodology
Our focus is to investigate whether an OTA’s ranking of hotels depends on how the hotel’s
prices at other OTAs or on the hotel’s direct online sales channel relate to the hotel’s price
at this OTA. For this we estimate equation 12 using two complementary approaches: the
non-linear, rank-ordered logit and the linear ordinary least squares (OLS) with hotel fixed
effects.
Rank-ordered logit. In the rank-ordered logit model, we assume that the OTA ranking
can be thought of as the result from assigning every hotel a score based on a linear equation
of the form
Scores,i = β′Xs,i + εs,i, (13)
where s is the set of offers that are responsive to the user’s search request and i is the
hotel. The vector of explanatory variablesXs,i includes observable variables as in equation
12 that influence the score. For a technical description of the estimator, see Beggs et
al. (1981).40 In short, the estimator estimates the parameters of the scoring function
by comparing selected to non-selected alternatives like a standard logit. Additionally,
it accounts for the ranking of the alternatives by comparing better to worse ranking
40 It is also known as the Placket-Luce model (Marden, 1995), the exploded logit model (Punj and
Staelin, 1978), and the choice-based method of conjoint analysis (Hair et al., 2010).
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positions. The best-ranked hotel should have a higher score than the second-best ranked
hotel, and the latter a higher score than the third-best ranked hotel. Under the assumption
that the error terms εs,i are independently distributed and follow an extreme value type I
distribution, the probability that a hotel is ranked first can be written in the multinomial
logit form
pii,s = Pr{Scores,1 > max(Scores,2, ..., Scores,n)} = exp(Scores,i)∑n
j=1 exp(Scores,j)
. (14)
The probability of observing a specific ranking can be written as the product of the terms
in expression 14. This is consistent with sequential decision-making where the algorithm
first chooses the best-ranked hotel, and then the best-ranked hotel among the rest, and so
on. The rank-ordered logit can therefore also be thought of as a conditional logit for each
subset of rankings. We estimate the parameters with maximum likelihood.41 A higher
coefficient implies a higher score, that is, a better ranking position, and thus a better
visibility for consumers. As in all non-linear models, without further assumptions the
estimated coefficients are not identified in their scale, but only their direction.
Linear fixed effect model. As including hotel fixed effects is computationally too
burdensome in the rank-ordered logit model, we additionally estimate linear models of
the form
Rankingi,s = β′Xi,s + γ′Zs + ξi + εi,s (15)
where Zs are additional time-varying controls that do not vary for the hotels of a search
result (for instance, controls for local seasonality and booking-month fixed effects) and
ξi are hotel fixed effects. The latter allow us to remove all unobserved time-constant
heterogeneity between hotels and focus on whether variation in prices for a given hotel
changes that hotel’s rank. Note that a better ranking because of a higher score corresponds
to a lower number. Therefore, we invert the dependent variable in the regressions by
subtracting it from the number of entries in the search result to ease comparison.
Mapping from predictions to observed variables. Our dependent variable in both
approaches is the observed ranking position of each hotel offer in an OTA’s search results.
The set of explanatory variables consists of three parts. First, we control for the gross
41 To decrease the computational burden, we treat rankings below the 10th position as incomplete.
This ensures that the estimates are more precise for the most relevant top positions. However, the
results are qualitatively the same for other thresholds (e.g., the 5th or 20th position).
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match value of the hotel by the average rating of the hotel on the OTA as a measure
of consumer satisfaction, further variables accounting for quality (such as an included
breakfast and payment terms) and time-constant hotel characteristics, such as the hotel
size (number of rooms), the type of the hotel (hotel chain vs. independent hotel), the
proximity to public transport, the number of stars and, of course, the price at the OTA.
Second, the OTA might rank hotel offers higher if they are more profitable. Besides the
price at the OTA, we therefore include measures indicating whether the hotel pays a higher
commission rate (i.e., elevated fees in order to improve the ranking) and information about
the number of past bookings on the OTA website itself (as reported by the OTA) to proxy
for the past conversion rate. Third, to see whether the OTA directly conditions rankings
on prices of other channels (for a given booking likelihood), we include the availability
of the same offer on other channels, as well as the respective relative price difference.
We discuss later to what extent we fully capture the booking likelihood with the other
variables (including past bookings).
5.3 Identification
The key challenge is to identify whether there is a causal link between the price charged
by a hotel on a competing sales channel and the rank of that hotel at a particular OTA.
There are several issues to address.
Heterogeneity between hotels. If for an OTA the absolute commission income is
higher – other things equal – it has an incentive to rank the hotel better. A high com-
mission income can be either due to a higher commission rate paid by the hotel or a
higher price at a given rate. If for some reason hotels with a lower absolute commission
typically discount the direct channel price more, we could get a spurious negative correla-
tion between a good ranking position and the OTA’s price markup relative to the direct
channel.
We deal with this unobserved heterogeneity across hotels in several ways. One is that
we include indicators of the commission rate. These are promotional activities of hotels
as reported by the OTA (which are available in the case of Expedia) and information on
whether hotels paid elevated fees in order to improve their rankings (as reflected in the
Preferred Partner Program of Booking.com). We also include the price level at the OTA
as a control variable, as this has a direct effect on the absolute commission income of the
OTA. Finally, in the linear regressions we remove time-constant unobserved heterogeneity
between hotels by including hotel fixed effects.
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Changes in commission rates. In addition to unobserved time-constant heterogeneity
across hotels, there might also be unobserved changes in the commission rate that applies
to the hotel. These changes might affect both the pricing across channels and the ranking
of the hotel at an OTA. In particular, as a higher commission rate implies a higher
distribution cost for the hotel when selling through the OTA, the hotel might also increase
the price it charges at the OTA. Indirectly, it might also affect the price the hotel charges
on its website. An obvious reason for this is a price parity clause.
We control for changes in the price charged by the hotel at the OTA under investigation,
as this price should be mainly affected by an increase of the distribution costs at this
OTA. Our main approach is that we regress the hotel’s rank at an OTA on the (absolute)
OTA price and the relative difference of the price on other channels and that OTA’s price.
Relative differences allow the comparison between hotels with different absolute average
price levels and decrease the potential spurious correlation between the price and the
deviation. As robustness checks, we also consider alternative specifications, in particular
the absolute difference of prices across channels or indicators for the level of deviations.
In addition, economic reasoning helps us to deal with this potential identification issue.
An identification problem arises only if, in response to an increase of the commission at an
OTA, the hotel increases the prices on competing – and now relatively cheaper channels –
more than at the OTA (and analogously for a cut). In this case there would be a spurious
positive correlation between a better ranking position and a higher (= less aggressive)
price on competing sales channels. However, in response to an increase of the commission
rate at an OTA a larger price increase on competing channels than at the OTA does not
seem likely. In particular, this does not occur in our theoretical model presented above,
and
i. if there is a parity such that all prices, and changes therein, are equal, and
ii. if for some reason the hotel always sets the direct price equal to a fraction of
the OTA price (as long as it is lower).42
Regarding (i), note that if in response to an increase of the hotel’s marginal costs at the
OTA all prices increase uniformly, we can control for this with the OTA’s price. In par-
ticular, the difference between the OTA price and competing prices would be unchanged.
Regarding (ii), consider the case that the original OTA price was 100, and the direct price
is set at 90 percent of that. If the hotel now sets the OTA price to 110, the direct price
42 For instance, hoteliers indicated in our phone interviews that they would set the direct price equal
to the OTA price minus half the OTA commission rate.
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would be 99, such that the difference would increase from 10 to 11. As a consequence, the
absolute markup of an OTA price over a direct price would have increased. This would
yield a positive correlation between the OTA markup and attractive ranking, which is
contrary to our hypothesis. As a consequence, if we nevertheless find results in line with
our hypothesis, this should not be driven by the above described mechanism.
Reverse causality. We argue that there is a causal link between the price charged by
a hotel on a competing sales channel and the rank of that hotel at a particular OTA.
Another concern might be that the link is reversed – that means a hotel facing a bad
ranking position might decide to offer a lower price only at competing sales channels.
Although it is far from clear that this would be the optimal response of a profit-maximizing
hotel, we nevertheless address this concern econometrically by analyzing the timing of the
deviations of hotels and the changes in the subsequent ranking to show that it is indeed
the OTA reacting to a change in behavior and not the reverse.
6 Data
6.1 Data collection
For our empirical analysis we primarily need data on 1) hotel rankings of OTAs, and 2)
prices that hotels post on different channels. As controls, we need data on the charac-
teristics of hotels that can explain their attractiveness to consumers, as well as data on
other determinants of the profitability of a hotel offer for the OTA (such as promotions
and indicators of different commission rates). We collected hotel characteristics and the
default rankings of hotels directly from the major OTAs Booking.com and Expedia (de-
noted by “Our top picks” and “Recommended,” respectively). We obtained the prices
of hotels on channels other than Booking.com and Expedia from Kayak.43 Kayak is a
travel meta-search engine that collects information from various online channels such as
the OTAs Booking.com, Expedia, and the hotels’ direct online channel. We understand
that Kayak derives revenues from advertising placements on its websites, as well as from
mobile apps and from sending referrals to travel service providers, such as hotels and
OTAs.44 Kayak displays information on availability and prices and uses interfaces with
the OTAs that allow this information to be retrieved from them while hotels can provide
43 We use the German edition of the respective websites as price discrimination between different
countries is not very frequent in the hotel industry, as discussed in section 3.
44 See page 2 of Booking Holdings Annual Report 2017 (last accessed August 31, 2018).
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information on their direct channel prices by making use of their own booking engine or
a third-party booking engine provider.45
From the three websites Booking.com, Expedia, and Kayak, we collected data between
mid-July 2016 until the end of January 2017. The data collection took place by performing
search requests, consisting of a travel destination, the travel dates, the number of travelers
and the number of rooms, e.g., two persons looking for one room in Rome for an overnight
stay in two weeks from today. The prices46 are for overnight stays for two persons in one
room on the same day, the 7th, and 14th day ahead. We collected search results and hotel
prices for 250 travel destinations. These are from 13 different countries and constitute the
countries’ largest cities as well as popular tourist destinations.47 As, according to previous
studies (Hannak et al., 2014), user-specific rankings and prices seem less relevant on hotel
OTA websites, and to decrease the burden for the platforms, we focused on collecting data
for an anonymous “average” user.48 In response to a search request, all three websites
list results that are then collected and combined into one database. For Booking.com
and Expedia the “default” rankings of the recommended search results are retrieved,
without any search refinements.49 We merge hotels’ data across platforms using the
textual similarity of the hotel name (after filtering for city and country) and by retrieving
the first Google hit when searching for a hotel for each platform.50 Hotels which we did
not find by these techniques we looked up manually. We also manually checked every
matched entry in the end for consistency. In theory, if all hotels always posted their room
offers on all three websites, one would observe the same set of results. Of course, this is
not the case, and in practice there are additional differences because of the different search
criteria of each website (i.e., within-municipality or perimeter-around-geographic center).
Technical problems during data collection (due to server downtimes or access changes)
also led to the non-availability of specific channel prices in some instances. When this
happened, we excluded from our database the search results from all three websites.
45 Booking engines are providers that offer the services necessary to connect the hotel to Kayak, such
as Fastbooking, Travelclick, and Derbysoft.
46 Prices on all platforms always include the value added tax (VAT) and can include tourism taxes,
depending on whether this is mandatory under national or local legislation.
47 See Appendix B for a detailed list.
48 We ran an identical search query on each of the three platforms, with the script starting at the same
time from servers located in Germany, which are randomly chosen from a pool of over 100 different
IP addresses. We used the same browser profile for every search request, with cookies and browsing
history being cleared after each request and a new browser session being created every time.
49 If a hotel had more than one entry in the list shown in response to a search request, we just kept the
entry of the hotel with the best rank. We excluded hotels that the OTA presented as being booked
out (and hence without a price).
50 To find hotel A in city B on platform www.ota.com, we ran search requests on Google such as “hotel
A B site:www.ota.com” and took the first result as the hotel’s profile on this OTA.
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We amend our dataset with two measures for destination-specific demand. First, to mea-
sure the non-availability of rooms or hotels at a given travel destination for Booking.com,
we use the information provided at the top of the search results (“City x is y% unavail-
able for your dates on our site”).51 For Expedia, this information was not available such
that we took the average of the non-availability measures from Booking.com and Kayak.
Second, we retrieved time series data from Google Trends for our observation period to
approximate the tourism demand for hotels in particular destinations. The data comprises
the aggregated search volume of specific queries on Google over time.52 Furthermore, to
have a control variable for the booking likelihood (conversion rate), we include the number
of past bookings as reported in the search results by the platforms.53
6.2 Descriptive statistics
We create separate datasets for Booking.com and Expedia. Each dataset includes the
search results of the OTA, as well as the hotels’ prices on other channels, which we took
from both Kayak and the other OTA website directly.
Table 1: Characteristics of hotels on Booking.com
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Hotel Stars 3.22 0.79 1.00 5.00
(Average) User Rating 8.14 0.72 3.30 10.00
(Average) Number of User Ratings 555.13 713.65 3.00 12350.87
Number of Rooms 61.08 71.55 1.00 1590.00
Chain Hotel 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Public Transportation 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
Preferred Partner (at least once) 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Observations 22984
Hotels in the dataset. The dataset of Booking.com contains almost 23,000 hotels
(Table 1). The average hotel in the dataset has around three out of five stars and received
an average of 8.14 points from 10 in roughly 555 ratings from past hotel consumers. There
is also information on how many rooms a hotel has (around 61 on average), whether the
51 Anecdotally, we heard from hoteliers that they themselves use this measure as a demand predictor.
52 Similar data has been used as a predictor of actual tourism data in other studies. The collection
and validation of this data is explained in Online Appendix III of Hunold et al. (2018).
53 As in many jurisdictions it is illegal to base ads on false information (see section 5 of the Act Against
Unfair Competition for Germany), we are confident that these website data, although addressing
consumers, are informative of the actual number of bookings (last accessed August 31, 2018).
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hotel is part of a chain (27 percent), and whether the hotel is located close to public
transportation (68 percent).54 Forty-two percent registered for the Preferred Partner
Program in the observation period or before, which essentially means that the hotel paid
an extra commission to the platform in order to get a better ranking.55
Table 2: Characteristics of hotels on Expedia
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Hotel Stars 3.13 0.90 0.00 5.00
(Average) User Rating 3.98 0.51 1.20 5.00
(Average) Number of User Ratings 194.68 341.26 1.00 7682.22
Number of Rooms 68.03 81.90 0.00 2300.00
Chain Hotel 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Sponsored Ad (at least once) 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Observations 18977
The composition of hotels in the Expedia dataset differs only slightly (Table 2) from that
of Booking.com. The average number of stars is also about three, the average rating is
close to four out of five points, which is comparable to the Booking.com average of eight
out of 10 points. Hotels on Expedia have fewer ratings on average (about 195 versus 555)
than hotels on Booking.com, more rooms (68 versus 61), and are more often part of a
chain (31 versus 27 percent). Five percent of the hotels on Expedia paid at least once for
a sponsored advertisement.
Ranked hotel offers. The unit of observation is a hotel room offer on a certain search
date for a specific travel period. Table 3 summarizes the search results of Booking.com.
In total, the Booking.com dataset consists of more than two million observations. The
number of listed hotel offers in response to a search query varies across travel destinations.
The average ranking of a search result is at 108 and the maximum number of ranked entries
is 1,599. The average price of a hotel posted on Booking.com is 130.77 EUR. We excluded
prices outside the range of 15 EUR to 2,000 EUR.56 For offers on Booking.com, we also
have information on whether the breakfast is included (it is in 46 percent of offers) and
whether a cancellation is free of charge (31 percent). On average, Booking.com reports
54 We retrieved the information about the number of rooms directly from the websites of Booking.com
and Expedia. If it was not available, we excluded those observations amounting to less than 1
percent. The information about chain membership was collected from Booking.com. For hotels on
Expedia that we did not find on Booking.com, we manually identified the remaining chains.
55 See page 20 of the Report on the Monitoring Exercise carried out in the Online Hotel Booking Sector
by EU Competition Authorities in 2016 (last accessed August 31, 2018).
56 One might still wonder whether these extreme cases emerge from data errors. We checked the offers
of the respective accommodations manually and found that this was not the case.
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that a hotel has been booked 13 times in the last three days. The share of sold out rooms
is, on average, 46 percent and the average Google Trends search volume measure is at
72.85 out of 100, which is the maximum.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the search results of Booking.com
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ranking Position 108.09 162.89 1.00 1599.00
Price at Booking 130.77 96.70 15.00 2000.00
Preferred Partner 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Hotel Stars 3.30 0.82 1.00 5.00
User Rating at Booking 8.10 0.71 3.30 10.00
Number of User Ratings 789.27 893.56 3.00 14757.00
Number of Rooms 76.35 90.23 1.00 1590.00
Chain Hotel 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Breakfast 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Free Cancellation 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Public Transportation 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00
# Bookings Last 3 Days 13.26 22.38 0.00 1266.00
% Hotels Sold Out 0.46 0.29 0.00 1.00
Google Trends 72.85 18.02 4.00 100.00
Kayak Dummy 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
Direct Dummy 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Direct Lower 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
(Booking-Direct)/Direct 0.00 0.04 -0.50 0.99
Expedia Dummy 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Expedia Lower 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia 0.00 0.08 -0.50 1.00
Observations 2307513
We also report whether we can find a specific hotel room offer also at Kayak and, in
particular, whether Kayak lists a direct channel offer. We show whether and how the
respective direct channel price differs from the price posted on Booking.com. We also find
the hotel offer on Kayak the same day for 67 percent of the Booking.com observations.
For 16 percent of all observations, we note that the hotel offers a direct price on Kayak.
Before going into more detail about the deviations, we first conclude this subsection by
describing the properties of the Expedia dataset, which differ only slightly (Table 4) from
those of the Booking.com dataset. The average posted prices on Expedia are slightly lower
(121 EUR vs. 131 EUR). Our understanding of a sponsored advertisement on Expedia is
that hotels pay elevated commissions to be additionally shown in designated positions in
the search results, while they still appear in the generic search results. In our dataset, we
include only the generic search results, but measure whether, in the same search result,
the hotel was additionally shown in the form of a sponsored advertisement. This is the
case for only 1 percent of the observations. As an additional characteristic, we record
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whether the payment can be made on arrival (“Pay Later”), which is the case for 22
percent of the offers. Hotels listed on Expedia are more often found on Kayak according
to our data (compared with hotels listed on Booking.com). The remaining statistics with
respect to the direct channel are comparable with those of Booking.com. For every offer
on Expedia, we identify a corresponding direct channel listing on Kayak for 18 percent
and a listing on Booking.com for 63 percent of observations.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the search results of Expedia
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ranking Position 133.61 245.18 1.00 2092.00
Price at Expedia 121.20 89.43 16.00 2000.00
Sponsored Ad 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Hotel Stars 3.26 0.86 0.00 5.00
User Rating at Expedia 3.95 0.49 1.10 5.00
Number of User Ratings 240.00 424.27 1.00 10246.00
Number of Rooms 82.98 90.35 0.00 2300.00
Chain Hotel 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Pay Later 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
# Bookings Last 2 Days 1.00 3.59 0.00 276.00
% Hotels Sold Out 0.61 0.15 0.00 0.99
Google Trends 72.58 17.07 4.00 100.00
Kayak Dummy 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
Direct Dummy 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Direct Lower 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
(Expedia-Direct)/Direct 0.00 0.04 -0.50 1.00
Booking Dummy 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
Booking Lower 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
(Expedia-Booking)/Booking 0.00 0.08 -0.50 1.00
Observations 2457164
6.3 Price differences across channels
In our analysis we focus on the differences in the prices of the two major OTAs, Book-
ing.com and Expedia, as well as the hotel website. Given the significance of these channels,
price differences among these should be of primary interest for the OTAs and hotels.
Figure 2 depicts the differences between the Booking.com price and the direct price (left
panel) as well as the Expedia price (right panel).57 In about 27 percent of the observations,
the direct price is below the Booking.com price (cf. Figure 2). For these cases the average
57 For our analyses, we have ignored relative differences of less than -50 percent and more than 100
percent as they might stem from the misclassifications of hotel offers. However, these cases only
account for a negligible fraction of the dataset.
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difference amounts to about 12 percent. In about 15 percent of the observations the
Expedia price is below the Booking.com price, and the average difference in these cases
is 12 percent. Correspondingly, negative deviations are less frequent between OTAs.
Figure 2: Extent of downward deviations of the direct channel on Kayak and Expedia
toward Booking.com
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We observe a similar pattern in the deviations toward Expedia in Figure 3. While there is
a substantial share of negative deviations of the direct channel toward Expedia, negative
deviations on Booking.com toward Expedia are less frequent.
Figure 3: Extent of downward deviations of the direct channel on Kayak and Booking.com
toward Expedia
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7 Estimation results
7.1 Main regressions
We now present our regression of the hotels’ ranking position on the price differences across
channels and the control variables. A positive coefficient indicates that the explanatory
variable affects the ranking position positively, both in the rank-ordered logit and the
linear estimation with fixed effects.
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We estimate four different specifications for each dataset. The baseline specification (1)
includes only the hotel characteristics as well as the price and booking history at Book-
ing.com. Specification (2) additionally contains an indicator of whether we could identify
the hotel offer on the direct channel (“Channel Availability”) and – if this is the case
– also the difference in the Booking.com price and the direct price.58 Specification (3)
analogously contains the information on availability at Expedia and the respective price
difference. Specification (4) combines the information added in specifications (2) and (3).
Table 5: Determinants of Booking.com ranking – Rank-ordered logit results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price at Booking/100 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Preferred Partner 1.58∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗
Hotel Stars 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
User Rating at Booking 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Number of User Ratings/100 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Number of Rooms/100 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Chain Hotel 0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Breakfast 0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Free Cancellation 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
Public Transportation 0.33∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
# Bookings Last 3 Days 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(Booking-Direct)/Direct -0.44∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia -0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
Channel Availability No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2307513 2307513 2307513 2307513
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Log-Likelihood -1017972.67 -1008722.92 -1008732.13 -1008686.70
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Regressions of the ranking with rank-ordered logit. We first present the results of
the rank-ordered logit estimator and start with the ranking of Booking.com (Table 5). In
specification (1) one can see that hotels with more stars, higher consumer ratings, a higher
number of ratings, close to public transport, breakfast included, and free cancellation are
ranked higher at Booking.com. These findings are consistent with the expectation that
OTAs rank hotels of higher quality better. Moreover, hotels with more rooms and chain
58 The results for both Booking.com and Expedia are robust to only including hotels for which we
observe the prices on the direct channel on Kayak and Expedia and are thus not driven by the
absence of deviations.
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hotels are ranked better. It is not as straightforward that – other things equal – larger
hotels and chain hotels are ranked higher. It might be that these hotels have more offers
available at the OTA, are thus booked more often, and therefore ranked better by the
OTA. In addition, hotels with more bookings at Booking.com in the last three days have
a better ranking. Finally, hotel offers with a higher price on Booking.com have a better
rank. These results persist across all four specifications.
We comment now on specification (4), which is consistent with the results of specifications
(2) and (3). One can see that if the hotel’s direct channel price or the price at Expedia
is lower than the price at Booking.com, this leads to a worse ranking position. For the
non-linear, rank-ordered logit estimates, we can only interpret the size of the coefficients
relative to other coefficients of the regression. We observe that the effect of lower direct
channel prices is stronger than the effect of lower Expedia prices. A 10 percent deviation
on the direct channel has about the same effect as a decrease in (0.37/10)/0.12=0.308
points (out of 10) in the user rating.
We find similar effects for the Expedia ranking. The main difference is that higher prices
on Expedia itself lead, on average, to lower rankings at Expedia. The possibility to pay
on arrival improves the ranking. Apparently, on average, independent hotels also receive
a lower ranking. Interestingly, the effect of different prices on Booking.com is about
two times larger than the effect of different prices on the direct channel. A 10 percent
deviation in the price on the direct channel has a comparable effect to a decrease in
(0.40/10)/0.41=0.098 points (out of five) in the user rating.
Table 6: Determinants of Expedia ranking – Rank-ordered logit results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price at Expedia/100 -0.16∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
Sponsored Ad 0.55∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
Hotel Stars 0.46∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
User Rating at Expedia 0.34∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
Number of User Ratings/100 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
Number of Rooms/100 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Chain Hotel -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
Pay Later 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
# Bookings Last 2 Days 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(Expedia-Direct)/Direct -0.62∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(Expedia-Booking)/Booking -0.84∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗
Channel Availability No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2457164 2457164 2457164 2457164
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06
Log-Likelihood -1025005.56 -996150.79 -995504.57 -995474.98
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
32
Summary. In the rank-ordered logit regressions, lower prices on the direct channel or at
the other OTA lead to worse ranking positions at both Booking.com and Expedia.
Linear regressions of the ranking with hotel fixed effects. To rule out that our
findings are driven by unobserved heterogeneity between hotels, we estimate a linear
model with hotel fixed effects. Consequently, all time-constant hotel characteristics have
been excluded.59 To better account for time-varying effects, we include measures for local
seasonality and booking-month fixed effects.
Table 7: Determinants of Booking.com’s ranking – OLS with hotel fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price at Booking/100 4.73∗∗∗ 4.84∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 4.92∗∗∗
Preferred Partner 74.80∗∗∗ 74.81∗∗∗ 74.81∗∗∗ 74.80∗∗∗
User Rating at Booking -3.50 -3.85∗ -3.89∗ -3.88∗
# Bookings Last 3 Days 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
% Hotels Sold Out 40.66∗∗∗ 40.58∗∗∗ 40.56∗∗∗ 40.56∗∗∗
Google Trends -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(Booking-Direct)/Direct -11.94∗∗∗ -9.76∗∗∗
(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia -8.74∗∗∗ -7.93∗∗∗
Channel Availability No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2307513 2307513 2307513 2307513
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7 shows the results for Booking.com. Higher prices and higher commission rates
(in the form of participating in the Preferred Partner Program) lead to a better ranking.
An increase in the user rating leads to a worse ranking, while the number of bookings at
the OTA in the last three days continues to lead to a better ranking.60 As for seasonality,
a higher share of sold out rooms and a lower Google Trends search volume is correlated
with a better ranking. Most importantly, the relationship between more aggressive pricing
on competing channels and a worse ranking position is also significant when restricting
attention to changes of the variables within hotels over time. This is comparable for
59 We also exclude further offer characteristics such as “Breakfast” and “Free Cancellation” for Book-
ing.com and also “Pay Later” for Expedia, as these variables have a very low variation within hotels.
60 The low variation of the user rating across time can explain this inconclusive result. On Booking.com,
the average rating increased by 0.1 points, while on Expedia it worsened by 0.04 points. The 10th and
90th percentile of changes on Booking.com is also -/+ 0.1 points, while on Expedia the corresponding
figures are -0.2/+0.1.
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the Expedia ranking (Table 8). The results between OTAs differ for the variable Google
Trends and the user rating.61
Table 8: Determinants of Expedia’s ranking – OLS with hotel fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price at Expedia/100 -12.12∗∗∗ -11.80∗∗∗ -11.63∗∗∗ -11.52∗∗∗
Sponsored Ad 1.71∗ 1.71∗ 1.71∗ 1.70∗
User Rating at Expedia 3.17∗∗ 3.12∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗
# Bookings Last 2 Days 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
% Hotels Sold Out 140.45∗∗∗ 138.65∗∗∗ 137.87∗∗∗ 137.95∗∗∗
Google Trends 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(Expedia-Direct)/Direct -41.89∗∗∗ -33.99∗∗∗
(Expedia-Booking)/Booking -40.81∗∗∗ -38.86∗∗∗
Channel Availability No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2457164 2457164 2457164 2457164
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Summary. When eliminating time-constant unobserved heterogeneity by including hotel
fixed effects, lower prices on the direct channel or at the other OTA still lead to worse
ranking positions at both Booking.com and Expedia.
Discussion. The regression results are qualitatively similar across estimation methods
(rank-ordered logit and fixed effects) and, with at least one interesting exception, also
across OTAs (Booking.com and Expedia). Across all specifications, there is a positive
relationship between the measures of hotel quality and the ranking position.62 This is
consistent with all three theories of how the OTA might calculate the ranking.
Being a Preferred Partner at Booking.com typically means that the hotel has a higher
commission rate than other hotels. The positive coefficient indicates that hotels paying
a higher commission have a better ranking. The same holds for the positive coefficient
of “Sponsored Ad” in the Expedia regressions (it also means that the hotel offer is more
visible). Taken together, this indicates that both Booking.com and Expedia do not use a
pure “best match ranking,” but also rank hotels offers with a higher profitability better.
61 We also find that while the level of customer rating for the same hotel on Booking.com and Expedia
are highly correlated, changes do not correlate across platforms (r=.03) in our sample. This might
explain the different finding.
62 There is one exception, which is likely due to a lack of variation across time (see footnote 60).
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The positive coefficient for the number of hotel bookings at the OTA in the last days
could be taken as an indication that the ranking is not based purely on best match value
for consumers (determined in principle by quality measures and price), but also on the
booking likelihood and thus the profitability of the hotel offer for the OTA. However, we
are aware that our quality measures might not fully capture hotel quality, so that the
number of bookings might still be informative of this.
While the coefficient of the own price is positive in the Booking.com regression, it is
negative in the Expedia regression. Our theory predicts a negative coefficient of the hotel’s
price at the OTA in the case of a best match ranking, but – conditional on controlling for
the booking likelihood – a positive coefficient in the case of standard profit maximization
as a higher price increases the OTA’s margin. For the same reason, also in the case of the
direct conditioning of the ranking on the prices of other channels and when controlling
for price differentials, a positive coefficient of the hotel’s price at the OTA is conceivable.
However, it might as well be negative if – in a longer term perspective – the OTA also
cares about attracting consumers. Taken together, the negative own OTA price coefficient
seems to suggest that Expedia accounts for the price with more emphasis on the match
value, whereas Booking.com might put more emphasis on a higher margin.63
The coefficients of the relative differentials between the OTA price and prices at the
other (major) OTA as well as the hotel website are negative and significant across all
specifications. This strongly suggests that both OTAs do not employ a pure best match
ranking. If one believes that we are able to fully control for the booking likelihood, then
this would mean that both OTAs do not just employ standard profit maximization, but
condition directly on prices at competing channels. However, although we control for the
number of previous bookings, various quality measures and the OTA price, we cannot say
with certainty that we fully capture the booking likelihood at the OTA. Nevertheless, our
results are at least consistent with a direct conditioning of the ranking on prices at other
channels.
7.2 Robustness checks
In the last subsection we showed that controlling for many other factors, OTAs condition
their ranking on the hotel’s pricing across channels. Following up on the results with hotel
fixed effects, in this subsection we first investigate whether this conditioning is different
in countries with and without price parity clauses being allowed. Second, we employ
63 A caveat applies, as one should also keep in mind that we might have imprecise measures of the
booking likelihood, which should be affected by the OTA price as well.
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different specifications for the price differences across channels. Finally, we study the
timing of the relation between ranking and lower prices elsewhere. The respective results
are shown in Tables 14, 15, and 16 in Appendix C.
Different PPC regimes across jurisdictions. As outlined in section 3, price parity
clauses in the agreements between OTAs and hotels have been prohibited in various
countries. Making the ranking decision dependent on the prices of other sales channels
may then act as a substitute to PPCs for OTAs to discourage hotels from setting lower
prices on other channels. Our dataset covers the period from mid-July 2016 until the end
of January 2017, whereas most prohibitions of price parity clauses had already taken place
before or after.64 Therefore, we can only use cross-sectional variation to study differences
across regimes. For this, we distinguish between hotels in countries where PPCs were
prohibited (Germany and France) and where they were allowed in the analyzed time
frame (the remainder).65 Starting from the regressions in Tables 7 and 8 with hotel
fixed effects, we have built an indicator “PPC” for countries with PPCs and included
interactions with the relative differences of the OTA price and the other channel’s price.
The results are displayed in column (1) of Table 14 for Booking.com and Table 15 for
Expedia. For both platforms we find that, generally, the relative difference of the OTA
price toward the direct channel and the competing OTA price has a negative impact on
the ranking in all countries, irrespective of the PPC regime. For Booking.com we see
no significant difference in the way in which the platform treats deviations on the direct
channel in PPC countries, whereas there is a weakly significant and positive effect for
deviations on Expedia, indicating that it is more lenient with deviations on its competitors
in countries with PPCs. For Expedia, one can see that the interaction terms are both
strongly significant, positive, and high in magnitude. This means that Expedia is much
more lenient toward deviations on both the direct channel and Booking.com in PPC
countries. However, a statistical test for the difference of coefficients reveals that Expedia
still assigns worse ranking positions to deviating hotels in countries with PPCs, but only
to a smaller degree. These findings are in line with Proposition 1 that, regardless of
whether a PPC is enforced, an OTA always has an incentive to condition rankings on
other sales channel prices.
64 During our observation period, only Austria announced a ban of PPCs, starting January 1, 2017.
Italy announced that it planned to ban PPCs, however, the decision only became effective after our
observation period. For more information, see also section 3.
65 To be precise, in Germany Booking.com and HRS (the German OTA incumbent) were prohibited
from using any PPCs. Expedia, however, only announced that it would narrow down its PPCs to
the direct channel, while the German competition authority had an open case against Expedia on
that matter. We conjecture that Expedia did not enforce its narrow PPC with force anymore.
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Alternative specifications of deviations. In the main regression analyses we mea-
sure deviations on competing sales channels by calculating the relative difference of the
OTA price, i.e., “[(OTA Price) - (Other Price)]/(Other Price).” In the following, we
discuss the robustness of this approach.
• Taking the relative difference allows us to compare hotels with different absolute
average price levels and decreases the potential spurious correlation between the
price and the deviation. In column (2) of Table 14 for Booking.com and Table 15
for Expedia we show that we find qualitatively similar results when including the
absolute price difference between the OTA and the competing sales channel.
• Based on the prediction that conditioning rankings on the prices of other channels
gives hotels incentives to set not only equal, but also lower prices at the OTA, we
implicitly assumed that OTAs account for positive and negative deviations in the
same way. In column (3) of Tables 14 and 15 we distinguish between upward and
downward deviations. We find that an OTA takes both of these deviation types into
account.
• Finally, with our specification we assumed that OTAs take all levels of deviation in
the same way into account. To test this, we partitioned both positive and negative
deviations into whether they were above or below 10 percent and built correspond-
ing indicator variables included in column (4) of Tables 14 and 15. We find for –
both positive and negative – deviations above 10 percent that the ranking is signif-
icantly altered, whereas for any deviations below 10 percent the significance of the
relationship is often weak.66 This finding makes sense, as small deviations also occur
due to data transmission errors, e.g., slow updating, and OTAs therefore might only
focus on major deviations.
Timing of the relation between ranking and lower prices elsewhere. As an
additional robustness check, we analyze to which extent past and future differences of the
OTA price and the prices on other channels explain the ranking of a hotel on the OTA.
This also addresses the question of reverse causality in the sense that hotels might react in
their pricing to changes in rankings. For this we calculate past and future deviations for
several observation days around the date of ranking and include them in our regressions
with hotel fixed effects. We restrict the data to include only observations from days which
66 We also tried other thresholds, such as distinguishing deviations of “zero to below 5 percent,” “5 to
below 10 percent” and “10 percent and more” but found that the coefficients for the low deviations
were equally often not or only weakly significantly different from zero.
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are less than one week away plus the number of time periods we are interested in.67 This
means that the seventh lag may not be more than 14 days before. To facilitate this
computation, we only make use of search results where the booking date coincides with
the travel date (price deviations also occur most frequently for these observations).
• In Table 16, we report the results for Booking.com (1–3) and Expedia rankings (4–6).
Specifications (3) and (6) include the results of interest, while specifications (1) and
(4) are useful for comparison to specification (4) in Tables 7 and 8. Specifications (2)
and (5) are added to show changes in the determinants when the dataset is restricted
to observations where the past and future deviations are observable. Additionally,
we restrict our sample to hotels which have a direct channel on Kayak and which
are also listed on the respective other OTA. As reflected in specification (1) of
Table 16, only studying search results for which the booking and the travel date
coincide makes the impact of deviating on the direct channel insignificant for the
Booking.com rankings.
• For Expedia, we see that the ranking depends on the current deviations and not
on future values of deviations (as would be the case if the hotel reacted to a bad
ranking by deviating). Depending on the number of periods we control for, we
sometimes observe that past deviations also have significant coefficients. This is the
case in the current specification with seven periods (deviations on the direct channel
in t − 4 and Booking.com in t − 2, t − 3, t − 4, and t − 5 are significant). We find
similar results for Booking.com, where the respective ranking also depends on the
current deviation on Expedia, plus one instance of future deviations (deviation on
Booking.com in t+1) and past pricing behavior on the direct channel (deviation on
the direct channel in t− 7).
Summary. Hotel rankings are affected by prices on other channels, both in countries with
PPCs and countries without PPCs, but possibly more in the latter. We further find that
i) the effect of a worse ranking is robust to different specifications of the functional form
of the deviations, ii) OTAs take both downward and upward deviations on other channels
into account, and iii) OTAs are mostly concerned about substantial deviations with a
magnitude of around 10 percent and more. Finally, the strongest correlation between
ranking and lower direct prices is contemporaneous. We do not find a systematic pattern
of significant correlations between price differences today with rankings in the future.
67 Note that due to technical reasons we did not obtain data for every day of our observation period.
In order to account for outliers and bad sampling, we excluded hotels with less than 30 observations
which only make up for a negligible fraction.
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7.3 Characteristics of hotels that price differentiate across chan-
nels
We now investigate which hotels price differentiate, and under which circumstances they
do so. We run a set of descriptive regressions of the form
deviation
i,t
= β′Xi,t + γ′Zi,t + ξl + ηt + εi,t, (16)
where the dependent variable deviationi,t is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if
the price of hotel i on the OTA (Booking.com or Expedia) is above the price on another
channel (the hotel website or the other OTA), and else 0. ξl is a fixed effect for the
location l where hotel i is located and ηt is a booking-month fixed effect.
To better understand the short-run decision of hotels to undercut prices, we additionally
exploit the within-variation by substituting location fixed effects ξl with hotel fixed effects
ξi, yielding
deviationi,t = β′Xi,t + γ′Zi,t + ξi + ηt + εi,t. (17)
Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix D show the regression results for deviations on the direct
channel and Expedia, respectively, toward Booking.com. Specifications (1) to (3) explain
cross-sectional differences in hotel behavior while specification (4) employs hotel fixed
effects and therefore allows for within-variation interpretation.
In specification (1) one observes that independent hotels are more likely to deviate both on
the direct channel and Expedia. However, most of the characteristics affect the deviation
decision on the two channels differently. Higher priced and small hotels at Booking.com
are more likely to deviate on the direct channel. Conversely, hotels which have joined
Booking.com’s Preferred Partner Program, have more stars and a worse rating, deviate
more likely on Expedia.
In specification (2), we add information on the percentage of rooms sold out on Book-
ing.com in the same city and on hotel-individual demand. We observe that once rooms in
a city get scarcer, hotels tend to deviate more on the direct channel but not on Expedia.
The more bookings one hotel had in the last days on Booking.com, the less likely it was
to deviate on both the direct channel and Expedia. In specification (3), we additionally
control for the time horizon between the search and the travel date. One can see that
deviations in the direct channel are more likely if searching for a hotel on the day of travel,
while for Expedia we then see fewer deviations.
Finally, in specification (4) we add hotel fixed effects. As most variables are time-constant,
they drop out in this specification. For the direct channel, we find that hotels deviate
more if they have higher current prices, the share of booked hotels increases, and the
search and travel date coincide, while they deviate less with prior bookings made on the
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platform. We do not find any significant effects for the enrollment in the Preferred Partner
Program and for increases in the user rating; however, these variables also only have a
small variation in the observation period. As for Expedia, deviations are more likely to
occur with a higher share of sold out hotels and fewer bookings made on the platform.
Additionally, one observes a positive and weakly significant coefficient for the Preferred
Partner Program enrollment and deviations are more likely to occur when the distance
to the travel date is seven days.
The findings regarding the determinants of deviations on the direct channel toward Ex-
pedia are similar, as can be seen in Table 19. The main differences are that elevated
commission fees – as reflected by a sponsored advertisement – negatively influence the
decision to deviate. However, this result is not confirmed in specification (4). In specifi-
cations (1) to (3) we find that the number of user ratings affects the decision to deviate
negatively. The findings with respect to deviations on Booking.com toward Expedia (Ta-
ble 20) are similar, such that independent hotels are more likely to undercut. Additionally,
prices are lower on Booking.com compared to Expedia if the travel date is close to the
booking date and for hotels that are small and have worse ratings.
Summary. We find that hotels price differentiate in a plausible way. For instance, hotels
set the direct channel price lower if demand is high and the travel date is close to the
booking date.
8 Conclusion
We address the question of whether OTAs rank hotels worse in their default search results
if these charge lower prices at other OTAs or on their own website. Our conceptual starting
point is a “best match ranking” that gives a more prominent position, at the top of the
list, to the hotel offers with the best match values. This matters because consumers see
and book prominent offers more often than less visible offers down in the list of search
results (Ursu, 2018). We then demonstrate that it can be profit-maximizing for an OTA
to deviate from a best match ranking (we label these rankings biased), both when the
OTA employs a standard profit maximization strategy and when it directly conditions
the ranking on prices at competing channels.
If the OTA employs a standard profit maximization for given hotel prices, it is best
off when presenting the hotel with the highest product of hotel price, commission rate,
and booking likelihood at the OTA (conversion rate) most prominently. Lower prices of
the hotel on competing channels reduce the booking likelihood if consumers that found
the hotel at the OTA then consider booking it elsewhere. Consequently, hotels with
lower prices on other channels are less visible and are thus less frequently booked at the
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OTA. Anticipating this affects the pricing of hotels and can reduce price dispersion across
channels.
An OTA may also employ a policy of conditioning its ranking directly on the price dif-
ferentials of hotels across channels and may in particular rank hotels with a lower price
elsewhere worse. A more drastic down-ranking might not even be in the short-term inter-
est of the OTA, as described above. However, such a policy can discipline hotels and thus
lead to much less aggressive prices elsewhere. If it is very effective, it can even lead to
equal prices across channels like a (successfully enforced) price parity clause. This drastic
down-ranking can ultimately raise the OTA’s profits even more than the standard profit
maximization.
Building on this theory, we have empirically investigated whether the position of a hotel
in the search results of Booking.com and Expedia depends on the prices charged by the
hotel on other channels. We find that for a given price at an OTA (either Booking.com
or Expedia), a lower price at the other OTA or on the hotel’s website leads to a worse
ranking position. We obtain these results with both a rank-ordered logit model and linear
regressions with hotel fixed effects. We find this relationship both in countries with and
without PPC clauses. It is also robust to different functional forms of the price differences
and is significant for both downward and upward deviations. It is more pronounced for
substantial price differences of around 10% and above. When using specifications with
lags and leads of the price differences across channels, we do not see a systematic pattern
of significant correlations between price differences in the future with rankings today
(which could be an indication of reverse causality). Finally, we also find that hotels price
differentiate in a plausible way. For instance, hotels set the direct channel price lower if
demand is high and the travel date is close to the booking date.
In summary, our results suggest that OTAs make the ranking of their recommended
search results dependent on factors that are relevant for the OTA to maximize its profit,
but arguably not to maximize the match value of customers. In particular, we obtain
the relationship between lower prices on competing channels and a worse ranking when
controlling for other factors, such as the number of bookings of the hotel at the OTA in
the previous days, which should already be highly correlated with the conversion rate at
the OTA. This raises the question of whether OTAs only optimize their recommended
ranking with respect to their conversion rate in the short term, or whether they directly
condition their ranking on the hotels’ prices on competing channels. If one believes that
we are able to fully control for the booking likelihood, then this would suggest that
both Booking.com and Expedia do not just employ standard profit maximization but
condition directly on prices at competing channels. However, although we control for the
number of previous bookings, various quality measures, and the OTA price, we cannot say
with certainty that we fully capture the booking likelihood at the OTA. Nevertheless, our
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results are consistent with a direct conditioning of the ranking on prices at other channels.
Interestingly, for Expedia we find a larger effect of lower prices on competing channels on
the ranking than for Booking.com. This could indicate that Booking.com is more careful
because it committed to competition authorities in Europe that “Booking.com’s ranking
algorithm will not take into account directly whether an accommodation refuses to enter
into or does not comply with Price Parity [...].”68
Our study complements a hotel survey conducted by various European competition au-
thorities. In their report of April 2017, the authorities state that “for the 21% of respon-
dents that did price differentiate between OTAs, the most frequent reason given was to
increase the hotel’s visibility on a particular OTA (for example, its display ranking).”69
According to the report, “many hotels mentioned measures taken by OTAs to ’penalize’
unwanted behavior by hotels – such as price and/or availability differentiation – with-
out relying on parity clauses.” These measures would include “’downgrading’ the hotel
(lowering its ranking) in the OTA’s search results.”70
Our analysis cannot provide a definite conclusion on what kind of OTA ranking of hotels
is socially optimal. Yet, we do see two potential risks of an OTA’s ranking optimization
being based on measures such as the prices of competing offers, which by themselves are
unrelated to the intrinsic consumer value of the offers presented by the OTA.
One potential risk is that such a ranking optimization can have effects comparable to
those of price parity clauses. PPCs have been forbidden as practices that might lead to
excessively high commission rates by competition authorities and legislators in various
European countries, whereas they are legal in the US (and other parts of the world).71
Another potential risk is that frequent deviations of an OTA from a best match ranking
can lead to a low search quality for consumers. However, even if one establishes such
a relationship with certainty (and we do not claim to do so), the policy implications
are not clear. On the one hand, regulating in which order an ordinary retailer should
present the available products seems far-fetched. On the other hand, how large online
information providers present their information is arguably of relevance. In this context,
it is interesting to note the different decisions of competition authorities in the EU and
the US with respect to the search bias allegations against Google. Their conclusions
range from the European’s high fine of €2.42 billion for Google having allegedly biased its
68 See section 4 of the Booking.com commitments to the Swedish competition authority of April 2015
(last accessed August 31, 2018). Booking.com made comparable commitments in France and Italy.
69 See paragraph 10 of the Report on the Monitoring Exercise carried out in the Online Hotel Booking
Sector by EU Competition Authorities in 2016 (last accessed August 31, 2018).
70 See paragraph 50 of the report, see footnote 69.
71 See section 3 for details.
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organic search results with the objective of placing competitive offers in an unfavorable
way72 to the FTC’s statement that changes in Google’s search algorithm have a legitimate
business justification could plausibly be viewed as an improvement in the overall quality
of Google’s search results.73
In terms of consumer protection, it seems desirable that consumers are made aware of
how such rankings, which are called “Recommended” or “Our top picks,” are being com-
puted. For instance, consider that consumers know that “recommended” offers do not
(necessarily) appear high in the list because they offer the best value for money, but that
the offers might possibly be ranked high because they maximize the expected profit of
the OTA. Consumers with this awareness might pay less attention to such a ranking and
make better choices. In response to this, it might become desirable for OTAs to publicly
commit to rank offers in their “recommended” list only with respect to consumers’ value
for money. This could lead to both a higher search quality and might eliminate the po-
tentially anti-competitive effects of disciplining hotels in their pricing through the ranking
of search results.
72 See the press release by the European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion
for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping
service (last accessed August 31, 2018).
73 See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter
of Google Inc. FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 2013 (last accessed August 31, 2018).
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. The expected channel revenue pOTAi qOTAi is maximized by a price that
solves
qOTAi + pOTAi
(
∂qOTAi
∂pOTAi
+ ∂q
OTA
i
∂pDIRi
)
= 0. (18)
The partial derivatives of piCi are given by
∂piCi
∂pOTAi
= (1− ci) qOTAi +
(
(1− ci) pOTAi − b
) ∂qOTAi
∂pOTAi
+
(
pDIRi − b
) ∂qDIRi
∂pOTAi
= 0, (19)
∂piCi
∂pDIRi
= qDIRi +
(
pDIRi − b
) ∂qDIRi
∂pDIRi
+
(
(1− ci) pOTAi − b
) ∂qOTAi
∂pDIRi
= 0. (20)
As prices and thus quantities must be equal with price parity, equation (8) simplifies to
qki + pi
(
∂qki
∂pki
+ ∂q
k
i
∂p−ki
)
− 2b(2− ci)
(
∂qki
∂pki
+ ∂q
k
i
∂p−ki
)
= 0,
which implies a larger optimal price than (18).
46
Proof of Proposition 2. In equilibrium it must hold that ∂pii
∂pOTAi
+ ∂pii
∂pDIRi
= 0, which is
equivalent to(
∂piCi
∂pOTAi
+ ∂pi
C
i
∂pDIRi
)
+ α
αφi(r∗) + (1− α)φ
′
i(r∗)
(
∂r∗
∂pOTAi
+ ∂r
∗
∂pDIRi
)
piCi = 0. (21)
At prices of pkL = pkR = p∗i (α = 0), the left-hand side of (21) is negative because the first
term is zero, but the second is negative as φ′i
∑
k
∂r∗
∂pki
< 0. The latter follows from Lemma
4 as p∗i (α = 0) is above the level that maximizes the OTA revenue of that hotel.
Proof of Lemma 5. For pDIRi = pOTAi the difference
∂piCi
∂pOTAi
− ∂piCi
∂pDIRi
reduces to
−ci
qOTAi + pOTAi
(
∂qOTAi
∂pOTAi
+ ∂q
OTA
i
∂pDIRi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 at optimal uniform price
−pOTAi 2
∂qOTAi
∂pDIRi
 .
At the level that results in uniform prices, the above expression must be positive. The
underlined part is negative as the uniform price is higher than the price that maximizes
the expected OTA revenue per interested consumer (see Lemma 4). The remainder in the
brackets is also negative as ∂q
OTA
i
∂pDIRi
> 0, which implies that the expression is positive. This
means that the hotel has an incentive to increase the OTA price relative to the direct
price.
B Appendix: Travel destinations in the dataset
Tables 9 until 13 show the travel destinations covered in our dataset which is as in Hunold
et al. (2018). We include the 25 biggest German cities (Table 10), a control sample of 20
pairs of German and non-German cities along the German border (Table 11), and other
countries for which we chose a composition of the 15 biggest cities and 15 most popular
travel destinations with the objective to gather representative data across touristic and
urban destinations for these countries.
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Table 9: Countries covered in dataset
Country Cities covered
Germany 25 biggest cities
Various 20 pairs of cities near German border
Italy 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations
Sweden 15 biggest cities and 14 tourist destinations
Canada 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations
France 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations
Austria 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations
Table 10: Germany – Top 25 cities
Germany Top 25 cities
Berlin Stuttgart Leipzig Bochum Karlsruhe
Hamburg Dusseldorf Dresden Wuppertal Mannheim
Munich Dortmund Hanover Bielefeld Augsburg
Cologne Essen Nuremberg Bonn Wiesbaden
Frankfurt am Main Bremen Duisburg Munster Gelsenkirchen
Table 11: Twin cities along German border
Pair German City Non-German neighbor Neighbor country
1 Flensburg Kolding Denmark
2 Puttgarden/Fehmarn Rodby Denmark
3 Wilhelmshaven Groningen The Netherlands
4 Borkum Schiermonnikoog The Netherlands
5 Rheine Enschede The Netherlands
6 Aachen Maastricht The Netherlands
7 Heringsdorf Wolin Poland
8 Greifswald Stettin Poland
9 Cottbus Zielona-Gora Poland
10 Trier Rosport Luxembourg
11 Monschau Eupen Belgium
12 Pruem St. Vith Belgium
13 Saarbrucken Metz France
14 Karlsruhe Strasbourg France
15 Freiburg Basel Switzerland
16 Konstanz St. Gallen Switzerland
17 Oberstdorf Bad Ischl Austria
18 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Innsbruck Austria
19 Nuremberg Pilsen Czech Republic
20 Dresden Prague Czech Republic
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Table 12: Cities covered in dataset
Italy Canada France Sweden Austria
Biggest Cities
Rome Toronto Paris Stockholm Vienna
Milan Montreal Marseille Göteborg Graz
Naples Vancouver Lyon Malmö Linz
Turin Calgary Toulouse Uppsala Salzburg
Palermo Edmonton Nice Västeras Innsbruck
Genoa Ottawa Nantes Örebro Klagenfurt
Bologna Québec Strasbourg Linköping Villach
Florence Winnipeg Montpellier Helsingborg Wels
Bari Hamilton Bordeaux Jönköping St. Pölten
Catania Kitchener Lille Norrköping Dornbirn
Venice London Rennes Lund Wiener Neustadt
Verona Victoria Reims Umea Steyr
Messina Saint Catharines Le Havre Gävle Feldkirch
Padua Halifax Saint-Étienne Boras Bregenz
Trieste Oshawa Toulon Eskilstuna Leonding
Tourist Destinations
Lecce Regina Grenoble Växjö Zell am See
Viareggio St. John’s Cannes Lulea Kitzbühel
Matera Fredericton Chambéry Falun Bad Hofgastein
Sanremo Charlotte Town Annecy Varberg Hermagor
Mantova Whitehorse Aix-les-Bains Visby Schladming
Vasto Yellowknife Menton Ystad Mittelberg
Merano Niagara On The Lake Albertville Kiruna Neustift
Caltagirone Whistler Bayeux Strömstad Bad Gastein
Montecatini
Terme
Banff Argelès-sur-Mer Ronneby Velden am Wörther
See
Narni Jasper Chamonix Jokkmokk Finkenstein am
Faaker See
Abano Terme Tofino Évian-les-Bains Grebbestad Kirchberg in Tirol
Ischia Dawson City Cavalaire-sur-
Mer
Marstrand St. Kanzian
Monte Argentario Churchill Saint-Gervais-
les-Bains
Jukkasjärvi Mayrhofen
San Felice Circeo Bay of Fundy Gruissan Stöllet Seefeld in Tirol
Santa Margherita
Ligure
Thousand Islands
National Park
Sainte-Marine Sölden
Selection of travel destinations
For Italy, Sweden, Canada, France, and Austria we selected the travel destinations in two
steps. First, we looked up the 15 biggest cities in terms of population on Wikipedia, re-
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spectively. Additionally, for each country, we collected information about popular tourist
destinations from travel guides and official tourism websites. We then ordered all these
destinations by population and again took the 15 biggest locations. For Italy, France,
Sweden, and Canada the websites were all accessed in January and February 2016. The
Austrian cities were selected in April 2016 after the Austrian competition authority an-
nounced proceedings against narrow PPCs later in 2016.
The sources of the travel destinations can be found in the following table:
Table 13: Sources for travel destination selection
Country Type Source
Italy Listing of health resorts wikipedia.de
10 most popular beaches telegraph.co.uk
Beyond Rome and Florence: 12
alternative Italian destinations
cnn.com
Sweden Top 10 places in Sweden neverstoptraveling.com
Top 10 green Attractions visitsweden.com
Canada Travelers Choice tripadvisor.com
Tourist attractions planetware.com
Places to Go de-keepexploring.canada.travel
France The top 10 beach holidays telegraph.co.uk
Travelers Choice Destinations tripadvisor.com
16 top-rated tourist attractions in the
French Alps
planetware.com
Austria Most popular winter destinations austriatourism.at
Most popular summer destinations austriatourism.at
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C Appendix: Robustness checks
Table 14: Determinants of Booking.com’s ranking – Additional Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price at Booking/100 4.92∗∗∗ 4.95∗∗∗ 4.92∗∗∗ 4.84∗∗∗
Preferred Partner 74.80∗∗∗ 74.82∗∗∗ 74.81∗∗∗ 74.81∗∗∗
User Rating at Booking -3.88∗ -3.86∗ -3.87∗ -3.90∗
# Bookings Last 3 Days 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
% Hotels Sold Out 40.56∗∗∗ 40.53∗∗∗ 40.56∗∗∗ 40.57∗∗∗
Google Trends -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(Booking-Direct)/Direct -10.26∗∗∗
(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia -10.76∗∗∗
PPC x (Booking-Direct)/Direct 1.02
PPC x (Booking-Expedia)/Expedia 4.28∗∗
Booking-Direct -0.05∗∗∗
Booking-Expedia -0.04∗∗∗
(Booking-Direct)/Direct > 0 -10.51∗∗∗
(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia > 0 -9.14∗∗∗
(Booking-Direct)/Direct < 0 -7.48∗∗
(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia < 0 -5.77∗∗∗
I[0 > (Booking-Direct)/Direct >= -0.1] 0.69∗
I[(Booking-Direct)/Direct < -0.1] 2.33∗∗∗
I[0 < (Booking-Direct)/Direct <= 0.1] 0.53
I[(Booking-Direct)/Direct > 0.1] -1.48∗∗
I[0 > (Booking-Expedia)/Expedia >= -0.1] -0.23
I[(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia < -0.1] 2.01∗∗∗
I[0 < (Booking-Expedia)/Expedia <= 0.1] 0.06
I[(Booking-Expedia)/Expedia > 0.1] -0.63∗
Channel Availability Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2307513 2307513 2307513 2307513
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Determinants of Expedia’s ranking – Additional Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price at Expedia/100 -11.50∗∗∗ -11.65∗∗∗ -11.52∗∗∗ -11.63∗∗∗
Sponsored Ad 1.66∗ 1.73∗ 1.71∗ 1.71∗
User Rating at Expedia 3.02∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗
# Bookings Last 2 Days 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
% Hotels Sold Out 137.91∗∗∗ 138.10∗∗∗ 137.98∗∗∗ 138.08∗∗∗
Google Trends 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(Expedia-Direct)/Direct -58.05∗∗∗
(Expedia-Booking)/Booking -66.89∗∗∗
PPC x (Expedia-Direct)/Direct 50.16∗∗∗
PPC x (Expedia-Booking)/Booking 44.05∗∗∗
Expedia-Direct -0.12∗∗∗
Expedia-Booking -0.16∗∗∗
(Expedia-Direct)/Direct > 0 -38.20∗∗∗
(Expedia-Booking)/Booking > 0 -39.28∗∗∗
(Expedia-Direct)/Direct < 0 -24.36∗∗∗
(Expedia-Booking)/Booking < 0 -38.27∗∗∗
I[0 > (Expedia-Direct)/Direct >= -0.1] 0.11
I[(Expedia-Direct)/Direct < -0.1] 6.92∗∗∗
I[0 < (Expedia-Direct)/Direct <= 0.1] -1.59∗
I[(Expedia-Direct)/Direct > 0.1] -10.12∗∗∗
I[0 > (Expedia-Booking)/Booking >= -0.1] 2.32∗∗∗
I[(Expedia-Booking)/Booking < -0.1] 8.36∗∗∗
I[0 < (Expedia-Booking)/Booking <= 0.1] -2.14∗∗∗
I[(Expedia-Booking)/Booking > 0.1] -10.15∗∗∗
Channel Availability Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2457164 2457164 2457164 2457164
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Time structure of the reaction to deviations
Booking.com Expedia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price at OTA/100 6.69∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗ 4.73∗∗∗ -1.65∗ -6.81∗∗∗ -6.80∗∗∗
PPP/Sponsored Ad^ 72.94∗∗∗ 61.46∗∗∗ 61.41∗∗∗ 2.20 2.11 1.84
User Rating at OTA -0.89 -11.08 -10.98 -5.43 0.20 -0.61
# Past Bookings° 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗∗
\% Hotels Sold Out 19.03∗∗∗ 19.33∗∗∗ 19.32∗∗∗ 134.49∗∗∗ 136.82∗∗∗ 136.45∗∗∗
Google Trends 0.14∗∗∗ 0.03 0.03 0.31∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.14∗
(OTA-Direct)/Direct -10.87∗∗∗ -1.99 -0.91 -35.86∗∗∗ -32.34∗∗∗ -31.34∗∗∗
(OTA-(Other OTA))/(Other OTA) -4.17 -7.01∗∗ -8.96∗∗∗ -38.38∗∗∗ -23.59∗∗∗ -18.16∗∗
Lag t− 1 - (Dev. on Direct) 0.21 0.44
Lag t− 2 - (Dev. on Direct) -0.20 -0.30
Lag t− 3 - (Dev. on Direct) 2.19 3.76
Lag t− 4 - (Dev. on Direct) -2.33 -9.60∗∗
Lag t− 5 - (Dev. on Direct) -0.60 4.29
Lag t− 6 - (Dev. on Direct) -0.28 0.28
Lag t− 7 - (Dev. on Direct) -4.01∗ -2.07
Lead t+ 1 - (Dev. on Direct) -2.34 -3.53
Lead t+ 2 - (Dev. on Direct) -1.83 -6.86
Lead t+ 3 - (Dev. on Direct) -0.62 -0.67
Lead t+ 4 - (Dev. on Direct) 0.55 1.16
Lead t+ 5 - (Dev. on Direct) -2.23 1.51
Lead t+ 6 - (Dev. on Direct) 0.19 10.34
Lead t+ 7 - (Dev. on Direct) -2.70 0.83
Lag t− 1 - (Dev. on other OTA) 1.80 -8.70
Lag t− 2 - (Dev. on other OTA) 3.22 -12.13∗
Lag t− 3 - (Dev. on other OTA) -1.10 -17.88∗∗
Lag t− 4 - (Dev. on other OTA) -2.22 -13.07∗∗∗
Lag t− 5 - (Dev. on other OTA) -1.41 -13.13∗∗
Lag t− 6 - (Dev. on other OTA) 0.30 -8.83
Lag t− 7 - (Dev. on other OTA) 3.88 -9.50
Lead t+ 1 - (Dev. on other OTA) 4.62∗∗ 0.25
Lead t+ 2 - (Dev. on other OTA) 3.94 4.51
Lead t+ 3 - (Dev. on other OTA) 2.24 9.08
Lead t+ 4 - (Dev. on other OTA) -1.48 -9.99
Lead t+ 5 - (Dev. on other OTA) 1.50 6.45
Lead t+ 6 - (Dev. on other OTA) -1.35 1.33
Lead t+ 7 - (Dev. on other OTA) 1.00 -0.96
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 146883 38697 38697 151397 44045 44045
R2 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.84 0.87 0.87
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: ^ For Booking.com, this is an indicator of whether the hotel is participating in the Preferred
Partner Program, while for Expedia it indicates that the hotel had a sponsored advertisement. ° Past
Bookings are as reported from the respective OTA; for Booking.com, this is in the last three days, while
for Expedia it is for the last two days.
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D Appendix: Price differentiation across channels
Table 17: Characteristics of hotels with lower prices on their websites than at Booking.com
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Price/100 2.77∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 5.67∗∗∗
Preferred Partner -2.07 -1.90 -1.89 -0.87
Hotel Stars -1.63 -1.60 -1.60
User Rating at Booking 0.44 0.45 0.45 -3.57
Number of User Ratings/100 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Number of Rooms/100 -2.06∗∗ -1.96∗∗ -1.98∗∗
Chain Hotel -16.83∗∗∗ -16.79∗∗∗ -16.79∗∗∗
Google Trends 0.04∗ 0.05∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.00
# Bookings Last 3 Days -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
% Hotels Sold Out 5.46∗∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗
7 days before -2.32∗∗∗ -2.21∗∗∗
14 days before -2.06∗∗ -2.00∗∗∗
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE City City City Hotel
Observations 375758 375758 375758 375758
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.46
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 18: Characteristics of hotels with lower prices at Expedia than at Booking.com
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Price/100 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.05
Preferred Partner 1.48∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.00∗
Hotel Stars 1.21∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
User Rating at Booking -1.16∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -1.10
Number of User Ratings/100 -0.04∗∗ -0.02 -0.02
Number of Rooms/100 -0.38 -0.33 -0.32
Chain Hotel -3.49∗∗∗ -3.48∗∗∗ -3.48∗∗∗
Google Trends -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01
# Bookings Last 3 Days -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
% Hotels Sold Out 0.41 0.65 0.82∗∗∗
7 days before 0.81∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
14 days before 0.04 -0.11
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE City City City Hotel
Observations 1622767 1622767 1622767 1622767
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.34
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
54
Table 19: Characteristics of hotels with lower prices on their websites than at Expedia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Price/100 3.69∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ 5.17∗∗∗
Sponsored Ad -3.68∗ -3.62∗ -3.56∗ -0.44
Hotel Stars -2.28 -2.17 -2.20
User Rating at Expedia 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.06
Number of User Ratings/100 -0.18∗∗ -0.16∗ -0.16∗
Number of Rooms/100 -1.46∗∗ -1.41∗∗ -1.43∗∗
Chain Hotel -17.41∗∗∗ -17.56∗∗∗ -17.56∗∗∗
Google Trends 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01
# Bookings Last 2 Days -0.09 -0.08 -0.00
% Hotels Sold Out 14.52∗∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗ 8.89∗∗∗
7 days before -3.33∗∗∗ -3.26∗∗∗
14 days before -2.59∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE City City City Hotel
Observations 444470 444470 444470 444470
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.45
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 20: Characteristics of hotels with lower prices at Booking.com than at Expedia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Price/100 -0.24 -0.17 -0.14 -0.37∗∗
Sponsored Ad 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.13
Hotel Stars -0.28 -0.30 -0.32
User Rating at Expedia -2.96∗∗∗ -2.99∗∗∗ -3.01∗∗∗ -4.56∗∗
Number of User Ratings/100 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Number of Rooms/100 -1.48∗∗∗ -1.46∗∗∗ -1.47∗∗∗
Chain Hotel -1.83∗∗∗ -1.84∗∗∗ -1.84∗∗∗
Google Trends 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05∗∗∗
# Bookings Last 2 Days -0.02 -0.02 0.03
% Hotels Sold Out -3.58 -5.43 -3.51∗∗∗
7 days before -1.18∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗
14 days before -1.54∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗∗
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE City City City Hotel
Observations 1554516 1554516 1554516 1554516
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.34
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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